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Child labor is a stubborn problem for South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which seems to be declining. 
In recent years, the trade openness has raised the response towards the problem of child labor in 
these adjacent regions, because of an additional influx of trade of differentiated products. Trade 
of differentiated products is a significant source of trade between developing countries and  
needed to be examined with regard to child labor. Existing studies tended to investigate the nexus 
between the trade and child labor in traditional trade theory setting and the results show mixed 
evidence across countries. Hence, it would be interesting for this research to embark upon the 
issue of new trade theory by demonstrating the trade effects of differentiated products on the 
child labor. Apart from that, it would be appealing to investigate the impact of free trade on the 
child labor in the major SAARC countries, namely, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka and selected ASEAN countries, namely, Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippine, and Thailand, 
which are known to have a relatively high number of child labor.  Empirically, this research 
assesses the theoretical treatment of  child labor and trade related effects by employing selection, 
scale and technique variables. The panel data method is employed to justify the spatial and 
temporal dimensions of the research. The estimation procedure of this dissertation consists of 
three main steps. In the first step, an exposure assessment of the simple model  by capturing 
selection, scale and technique effects obtained for the child labor in closed economy case. In the 
second step, a variable of trade combined with selection, scale and technique effects variables to 




interactions to check the trade-induced effects across the selected SAARC and ASEAN countries. 
The findings in this research confirm the importance of selection, scale and technique effects in 
the estimation of the full impact of international trade on child labor. Finally, this research 
proposes that the trade induced child labor effects can be worthwhile to address the underlying 
economies that gives a rise to offend child labor practices. The findings of this study recommends 
better policies to overcome the problem of child labor in the context of open economy and closed 
economy. 
 
Keywords: Trade liberalization, Child labor, Differentiated products 




Liberalisasi Perdagangan dan Buruh Kanak-kanak di Negara-negara SAARC 





Buruh kanak-kanak ialah masalah yang sukar ditangani oleh Pertubuhan Kerjasama 
Serantau Asia Selatan (SAARC) dan pertubuhan Negara-negara Asia Tenggara (ASEAN), 
dengan kadar yang semakin menurun. Sejak kebelakangan ini,  perdagangan bebas telah 
menimbulkan masalah buruh kanak-kanak di antara kawasan-kawasan yang berdekatan ekoran 
daripada peningkatan akitiviti perdagangan bagi  produk-produk yang berbeza. Perdagangan 
produk yang berbeza adalah sumber penting dalam perdagangan antara negara-negara 
membangun; maka usaha pemeriksaan teliti terhadap penggunaan buruh kanak-kanak perlu 
dilakukan. Kajian terdahulu mengkaji hubungan antara buruh kanak-kanak dan perdagangan 
berdasarkan teori perdagangan tradisional telah menunjukkan hasil kajian yang bercampuran 
buruh kanak-kanak. Oleh itu, kajian ini menyiasat isu yang berkait rapat dengan teori 
perdagangan baru, dengan menunjukkan kesan perdagangan produk-produk berbeza  terhadap 
buruh kanak-kanak. Selain itu, kajian ini juga akan memberikan maklumat yang penting 
berkaitan dengan kesan perdagangan bebas  terhadap buruh kanak-kanak di negara-negara 
SAARC utama iaitu, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal dan Sri Lanka dan negara-negara 
ASEAN yang terpilih iaitu, Kemboja, Indonesia, Filipina dan Thailand, yang terkenal dengan 




buruh kanak-kanak dan kesan teori perdagangan baru dengan mengambilkira kesan 
pembolehubah berkaitan pemilihan buruh, skala dan teknik. Kaedah data panel telah diguna 
untuk menjustifikasikan dimensi ruang dan masa kajian. Prosedur kajian ini terdiri daripada tiga 
langkah utama. Pada langkah pertama, hubungan kesan pemilihan, skala dan teknik oleh buruh 
kanak-kanak dalam model ekonomi tertutup. Pada langkah kedua, pembolehubah perdagangan 
digabungkan dengan kesan pilihan, skala dan teknik untuk mencari kesan perubahan dalam 
perdagangan buruh kanak-kanak. Selepas itu, langkah ketiga membentangkan interaksi 
perdagangan bagi memeriksa kesan perdagangan yang sedang berlaku di seluruh negara 
SAARC dan ASEAN yang terpilih. Hasil kajian ini membuktikan kepentingan kesan pemilihan, 
skala dan teknik dalam  pengkajian kesan perdangangan antarabangsa terhadap buruh kanak-
kanak. Implikasi ini kajian ini menyarankan polisi yang lebih baik bagi menangani masalah 
buruh kanak-kanak dalam konteks ekonomi terbuka dan ekonomi tertutup. 
 
Kata kunci:  Liberalisasi perdagangan, Buruh kanak-kanak, Produk-produk berbeza 
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1.1  Chapter Overview 
 
The chapter introduces the thesis. It provides the background of the study followed by 
the problem statement, general and specific study objectives. Further, it discusses the 
significance and scope of the study. Finally, it describes the outline of this thesis. 
  
1.2  Introduction 
 
The child labor is the use of children in industry or business that harms or keeps them 
away from school ( ILO, 2015). A robustness check on trade and child labor literature shows 
that demand for child labor is associated with demand for trading goods. One possible reason 
for the link between trade and child labor apparent in Romer and Frankel (1999) study shows 
that there is a strong association between trade and income as documented by Edmonds and 
Pavcnik (2005). The growing literature on the modern aspects of international trade sheds the 
new light on the effects of trade of differentiated products, its market size and the international 
division of labor. Whereas, the issue of child labor along with the trade of differentiated 
products is noteworthy and need to be debated in the age of new trade and globalization. The 




for educated and skilled workers in sufficient numbers to make it possible to create integrated 
production systems spanning more than one country. Economies that are taking part in 
international trade are expanding their potential beyond domestic borders to reach a global 
market. Trade liberalization is now becoming an important aspect of globalization, economic 
development and sustainability; nevertheless, the countries with accelerated growth in the labor 
intensive sector are viewed as contributing to the child labor violations (Chan, 2003).  
 
The theoretical work on labor and trade is relatively rich as compare to child labor and 
trade (Estevez, 2010). The discussions on trade impacts on labor are segregated into different 
categories i.e., the effects of income deviations, effects of variation in the relative returns to 
labor suitability, interaction effects of factor endowments, and effects of labor policy. 
Generally, it is viewed that higher level of trade is associated with greater levels of income, and 
these are not necessarily homogeneously distributed, comfort from trade do not accrue to the 
rich alone (Collier and Dollar, 2002). 
 
In the light of previous studies, this study discovers that research on child labor is rooted 
in one side of the story, namely the household's decision, which is related to the supply side of 
child labor, specifically based on income level of families. There are only a few studies such as 
Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005), Dinopolous and Zho (2007), Kis-Katos (2007) and Estevez 
(2011 and 2014) which examine the issue of child labor from the demand side. The mentioned 




goods and trade of homogeneous products affects the demand of child labor in exporting 
countries.  
 
While, this study is focusing on production and trade of differentiated products by  
utilizing  selection effect, this effect demonstrates that how changes in a number of firms 
parameter affect the relative demand of child workers. Particularly, trade induced child labor 
selection effect will determine whether trade liberalization is a remedy or exacerbate for child 
workers. Akram and Mahmood (2012) argue that trade of differentiated products is not as 
prevalent in developing countries as in developed countries, yet it is an important source of 
trade between the countries.  Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) confirm that such type of trade 
indirectly affects the child labor through overall market impacts and it can be observed with 
regard to child labor. Firms that are engaged in trade of differentiated products in developing 
countries usually related to those industries where the presence of child labor cannot be 
rebutted.  
 
In the light of traditional interpretation of trade and child labor literature, Estevez and 
Levy (2014) find out that impacts of trade on the demand of child labor vary across sectors and 
the demand of child labor is a function of child worker productivity. Previously, Kurokawa 
(2011) examines that highly skilled workers are complement with low skilled workers in 
production of symmetric intermediate varieties. The findings of this study validate that the trade 
has an impact on the demand of both skilled and unskilled labor, the same is true in case of 




child labor are interconnected and the increase in the demand of labor can affect the demand of 
child workers (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005). 
 
Estevez (2010) finds out that firms usually use both unskilled and skilled labor in the 
production of differentiated goods. The complimentary effect increases the skill premium and 
changes the demand of unskilled labor directly and indirectly  affects the demand of child labor. 
In a similar style, Estevez and Levy (2014) examine the effect of low and high skilled workers' 
wages, and choices made by firms to upgrade their techniques of production. Since, the 
advancement in the technique of production is biased toward skilled workers, and less chances 
of unskilled labor or child labor in the production of differentiated goods.  
 
1.3  Research Background 
 
The issue of child labor has caught a great attention in the modern economics 





 century period, see the worst scenarios on screen; the industrialized nations, especially the 
Western countries have experienced the worst form of child labor. The child labor issue is 
worthwhile to investigate the existing studies and at what level counterweight to entrench the 
child labor with the help of economic tools. As a result of sincere and continuing efforts, the 
world has now recognized the importance of human capital, innovation and knowledge to 




economy and it has adverse effects on the sustainable development (Swinnerton and Rogers, 
1999).  
 
Trade embargoes such as trade sanctions, outright bans and boycotts are popular 
remedies for child labor reduction. However, such instrument may have some unintended 
consequences for the poor countries. The ramification of traditional scholarly perception is that 
these sensations make the poor countries more unproductive, the only cure of child labor is 
prosperity via economic tools i.e. trade liberalization (Jafarey and Lahiri, 2002). Bhagwati 
(2001) states that the complex problems of an economy cannot be solved by sanctions; global 
issues such as child labor can only be solved by globalization. A trade sanction is a tool of anti-
globalization; as a matter of fact, anti-globalization sentiments are most prevalent in the rich 
countries and poor countries are affected by global elites policies. The sentiments are directly 
destroying the industries of poor countries (Wood, 1995) and making the poor countries a 
destitute place (Hameed and Nazir, 2009). As a result, the poor countries become an unsafe 
place for children (Emerson and Souza, 2011). 
 
The determinants of child labor are strongly related to macroeconomic variables such as 
performance of an economy, structural changes, behavior variations, and decision-making of 
economies. The demand and the supply side of the economy, both independently affect the 
child labor at the macro level. Poverty and inappropriate education system explain the child 
labor supply side, while the existence of a low paying informal economy is amongst the one of 




economy which determine the demand for child labor are the size of the informal economy, 
inflexible labor markets, instability of the firm’s structure, the failure of industries to scale up 
the production and lack capacity to adopt the modern manufacturing technologies (Basu et al., 
2010; Edmonds, 2010; Basu and Zarghamee, 2009; Edmonds and Schady, 2009). 
 
Traditional economist usually sees this issue solely through the lens of labor demand. 
The great Smith (1776) talks about the value of children in labor shortage societies, later Engels 
(1892) emphasizes on the working conditions of children during the initial stage of the 
industrial revolution. Marx (1867) also has a very serious concern about children, because the 
replacement of machines with muscular power is now allowing child labor formally. Marx 
points out that labor supply is not transparent, capitalist and parents are major exploiters 
because in 18
th
 century families are unable to meet their basic needs (Edmonds, 2007).  
 
Even in the current century, the situation of child labor is a global reality bites, 
especially in the developing countries. Children are treated as an adult labor, they engage in 
dangerous work and often has to work very long time in hazardous activities for a very low pay, 
their earnings are only 10 to 20 percent of adult male labor wages (Abebe and Bessell, 2011 and 
Webbink et al., 2012). Edmond and Pavcnik (2005), Kis-Katos (2007) and Estevez (2011) have 
examined the child labor by using global factors such as trade liberalization that affects the 
demand of child labor. These studies assume that child labor is common in those sectors which 




child labor in intra industry trade setting, they assume that children are nearly as productive as 
their adult counter partners and wage of child labor reflect the productivity of child workers.  
 
Labor force can be categorized into skilled and unskilled labor (Bharadwaj, 2014), male 
and female labor, adult and child labor (Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014). Adult labor and child 
labor are close substitutes (Basu and Van, 1998) and child labor are economical and can be 
employed in any field of work at cheapest price as compared to adult labor (Hindman, 2011), 
but this justification for hiring the child labor is not tolerable in civilized and developed 
countries because child labor is deprived of happiness and enjoyment of childhood life 
(Nieboer, 2011). An historical overview of these western nations tells us that the developed 
nations were also victimized the children at the initial stage of development. This holds true in 
sample of developing countries of Far-East Asia which have low child labor incidences (Lin, 
2011).  
 
A global picture of child labor shows that out of total child workers 45% are in Asia, 
40% are in Africa and only 6% in Latin America (ILO, 2012 and UNICEF, 2014). This figure 
imply that the child labor is still a colossal problem in Asia and Africa. In this context, the 
number of economically active children is highly concentrated in the poorest nations of Africa 
and Asia. The most serious concern is that many of these working children have to work in 





1.4  Definitions of Child Labor  
 
Child labor is defined as all economic activities that involve the children under the age of 
12 years (Islam and Choe, 2013). It also refers to a weekly economic exercise lasting enough 
to affect the education and health of those aged 12-14 (Dorji and Gyeltshen, 2013). In other 
words, it is defined as all hazardous work which could affect the health of children under the 
age of 18 (Aktar and Abdullah, 2013). 
 
UNICEF (2008) interprets the child labor as work that violates a minimum number of 
hours, depending on the age of an adolescent and on the type of work, such work is 
considered dangerous to the child and should therefore be eradicated. Ages 5-11, at least one 
hour of commercial activity or 28 hours of family work per week. Ages 12-14, at least 14 hours 
of commercial activity or 28 hours of family work per week. Ages 15-17, at least 43 hours of 
domestic or economic work per week (Johnson and Bahemuka, 2013). 
 
Ventevogel et al. (2013) define that child labor on the patterns of children`s activities. 
Such as expressed it on the basis of the adverse impact of work on children's mental, physical, 
moral and social development as well as deprivation of educational opportunities. Different 
countries enacted and introduced various legislations, for combating the child labor, which 
depend upon the socioeconomic constraints of these countries. These legislations have 
proposed for defining child labor to find a solution to the problem. These definitions provide 




South Asian countries are applying minimum age acts according to their economic, political 
and social structures.  
 
According to the international definition of employment, the child labor can be identified 
as economically active children if they work for at least one hour in a reference week
1
. Thus, 
child labor in this research is a substantial as promulgated by the ILO and world development 
indicators, which is based on the agency’s Minimum Age Convention No 138 (1973). Child 
labor is surprisingly difficult to define, this research establishes a normal definition and 
considered children under the age of 14, engage in economic activity.  
 
1.5  Child Labor in SAARC and ASEAN 
 
Figure 1 shows that child labor relatively looks small but if we compare in absolute term, it 
is intolerable in the South and South East Asian region, the population between 5-14 year old is 
under serious threats of hazardous work in industry and local family businesses. The countries 
like Nepal and Cambodia are facing a worse child labor situation due to limited trade facilities 
(Luong, 2011). India has relatively less child labor percentage, but the total volume of child 
labor victims is at an alarming level  because of a huge population share in the SAARC region. 
                                                     
1
 The calendar week containing the 12th day of the month, which is used as the time period for documenting 






Figure 1: Percentage of Children Aged 5 to 14 Years Engaged in Child Labor 
Source: UNICEF Global Databases (2014) 
 
India, Bangladesh and the Philippines are the leading countries in the Asia, which has a 
large number of children who are engaged in different kinds of production (Rahman and 
Khanam, 2012). In Bangladesh, there are more than 14 kinds of goods made by children, many 
of them are of an industrial nature, such as footwear, leather and textile including jute 
(Hindman, 2011). In the Philippines, most children are pushed into the labor force, and 
forcefully bounded to work on the family farm, but the most miserable, facts are to be, they 
found in mining pyrotechnics and pornography activities (Aldaba et al., 2003). India is the 
largest single producer of the juvenile workforce in the world due to the large population and 























Figure 2: Percentage of Child Labor in SAARC and ASEAN 
Source: UNICEF Global Databases (2014) 
 
Figure 2 shows the phenomenon of child labor in SAARC
2
 and ASEAN countries. The 
situation of child labor in Nepal is worst among all the countries of the region due to the 
intriguing relationship between adult minimum wage and child labor which is associated with 
conventional trade practices. Whereas, Cambodia is the worst country in South-East Asia due to 
limited trade facilities and war situations. In Bangladesh 13% children have to work in the labor 
market and most of the children are under age 15, while in Pakistan and Thailand 8 % children 
are engaged in child labor. Moreover, in India 12% children are engaged in child labor, but in 
absolute term the situation in India is the worst in the SAARC and ASEAN region. 
                                                     
2
 It is worth noting, that South Asia has 21.6 million children who are working, out of 246 million children 















The main cause of child labor in Indonesia, Philippines and Cambodia usually associated 
with the poverty and illiteracy level of their families especially their parents. Other exploratory 
factors of child labor are economic and social circumstances, high rates of unemployment, lack 
of awareness and lack of access to quality education (Kampan and Tanielian, 2014). Generally, 
child labor is condoned by the community (UNICEF, 2011) in numerous cases, adolescent
3
 
expects to work as adults, especially in the agronomic setting (Hall et al., 2011). 
 
1.6  Trade and Child Labor 
 
During the period of 1990 to 2010, the world observes the dramatic changes in the 
technologies, labor markets and the structure of trade due to trade advancement in the world 
(Meschi et al., 2011). The West is adopting more efficient and capital intensive green 
technologies and shifting its older and less labor intensive technologies to developing countries 
(Kucera and Roncolato, 2011). These structural changes are now becoming the source of 
change in the mode of trade (Kumar, 2013), now the developing regions like SAARC and 
ASEAN are moving towards the trade of differentiated products instead of trade of 
homogeneous goods (Akram and Mahmood, 2012). This transformation is changing the form of 
child labor in developing regions. Firms that are engaged in the production of differentiating 
goods may benefit from technology in which unskilled humans are not highly valued, whereas 
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other firms would benefit from more skilled and trained workforce (Baland and Robinson, 
2000). 
 
The opponents of trade liberalization advocate that growing labor demand due to market 
integration, increases the earning opportunities of children and surely leads to more child labor. 
Some human right specialists recommend the practice of trade sanctions tools, especially on the 
exports of those countries which have high levels of child labor, as a means to eliminate the 
child labor (Kis-Katos and Sparrow, 2011). 
 
Banerjee and Nag (2013) argue that child labor reduction can be achieved by trade 
liberalization and this reduction positively affects the labor productivity in a more than 
offsetting fashion. Past studies had focused on the child labor issue such as their education and 
poverty levels. However, studies on the nexus between child labor and trade appears to be 
limited (Kis-Katos and Sparrow, 2011). During the twentieth century child labor focus on the 
conditions of child workers (Hindman, 2011), however, during the 21
st
 century, existing studies 
shift their focus to the determinants, demand and supply side of the child labor (Blau, 2012). 
 
For instance, earlier studies centered mostly on the social cost of child labor (Nardinelli, 
1980), the widespread existence of this issue have now fallen into the economic benefit of 
ending child labor (Glut, 1995). Figure 3 shows that the global benefits of ending child labor 
can be 4300 billion US dollars in one fiscal year, the South Asia only region which can attain 





Figure 3: Economic Benefits of Ending Child Labor via Trade Liberalization (In Billion US$) 
Source: International Labor Organization (2002) 
 
Firms in transition economies, Malaysia and Singapore, entered the market economy 
with a bundle of resources and classified partially industrialized, these countries have relatively 
less child labor as compared to other countries that's why the economic benefits looks small, but 
these countries have already enjoyed the economic benefits of ending the child labor in the last 
two decades (Kenayathulla, 2012). On the other hand, some countries of the ASEAN region like 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippine, and Thailand are still facing child labor and trying to draw a 
line between acceptable and unacceptable child labor (Kampan and Tanielian, 2014). 
 
The political environment of reducing or eliminating child labor in the last decade of 
















libralizaton at global level (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005). If the child labor situation is 
examined at the beginning of the 21
st
 century, it was worse (ILO–IPEC, 2013), but the 
continuous struggles of non government organizations (NGOs), global collaboration and 




Figure 4: Worldwide Child Labor 
Source: ILO–IPEC (2013) 
 
Figure 4 shows that, at the beginning of the 21
st
 century, at global level, the conditions 
of factory work were needlessly unhealthy and oppressive for working children that were 246 
million in 2012, but in 2012 this trend decline to 168 million, this is a great achievement in the 
child labor reduction
 

















decline from 171 to 85 million (ILO-IPEC, 2013). It is interesting to note that the work on 
elimination of child labor is in the right direction, but the target of international child labor 
organizations is to eliminate the worst form of child labor
4
 at the end of 2016, it seems difficult 
but achievements are hopeful (van de Glind, 2010).  
 
The tendency of the decline in child labor is mainly because of trade liberalization. Fors 
(2012) illustrate that the trends in participation rates, for the children, as child labor 10-15 years 
between 2000 and 2012 are decreasing, from the year 2000 and on words the declining trend of 
child labor in the world seems to slow down surprisingly. In these years public officials and the 
media have shown a great sympathy in child labor, along with social awareness, the effect of 
economic growth on child labor starts to be left distinctly by increasing trade trends in 
developing countries. 
 
1.7  New Trade Theory and Child Labor 
 
Krugman's (1979) framework of international trade states that the industrial sector 
having features of increasing returns to scale
5
 and total number of firms in the industry shrinks 
although each one of the remaining firms produces more than before (Feenstra, 2003). Trade 
expands the consumption basket and enables the consumers to use both local and imported 
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varieties of goods. At the same time, when income level of a country increases due to trade 
openness; the country implements stricter child labor approach, which causes amplified child 
labor reduction activity (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005; Edmonds, 2015). The increasing returns 
to scale in Krugman’s framework triggers the producer to hire more efficient and skilled labor 
to raise the production level. This framework has the potential to support the child labor 
elimination policies and discourage the child labor, because the producer wants to produce more 
and additional unit of adult labor is not expensive for him due to increasing returns to scale. In 
this framework, there is a selection on the production side and the consumption side. The 
producer selects best available labor in the production process for making differentiated 
products (Miles et al., 1978) and the consumer has an option to select a variety of differentiated 
products (Krugman and Venables, 1996).  
 
Krugman’s framework (1979) on international trade find out that, only more competent 
firms have a potential to upgrade their scale of production by using more skilled workers due to 
increasing returns to scale (Krugman, 1979). Estevez (2011) concludes that child labor is an 
inappropriate option for producers than unskilled adult labor even after accounting for 
productivity differences. Estevez and Levy (2014) assume that, in the production of 
differentiated product, child labor is not a better option and productivity differences make it an 





1.8  Problem Statement  
 
Child labor has become an issue that invokes passion because it brings together people 
concerned about the exploitation of children on moral and ethical grounds, some of child labor 
issues are managed at national level while others are internationally workable (Edmonds and 
Pavcnik, 2005). Trade liberalization is combating the problems that are connected with the 
child labor and converting local constraints into an aggregated global constraint (Emerson and 
Souza, 2011).  
 
The effects of trade liberalization on child labor are universally debated and aroused great 
sympathy among reformers (Abebe and Bessell, 2011). From a theoretical point of view the 
effects are ambiguous (e.g., Basu et al. 2010) as trade liberalization works probably through 
various routes (such as Casson, 2012). There is a conventional view among economists that 
trade and child labor issues should be treated independently and separately (Basu and 
Zarghamee, 2009). Nevertheless, this approach need to be supported theoretically in the process 
of trade of differentiated product models as low wages generate child labor and upset the effects 
of trade liberalization on child labor, national welfare and income distribution (Doran, 2013). 
 
It is widely recognized that international trade raises the economic welfare, but, if a 
production is labor intensive then international trade leads to some detrimental effects on child 




structure of developing economies, sometimes it is beneficial in the short run and harmful in the 
long run or vice versa (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006).  
 
The incidence of child labor in the presence of monopolistic competitive firms and trade 
of differentiated products between structurally identical countries is remained ambiguous in the 
existing literature (Estevez, 2010). Furthermore, the effects of production of differentiated goods 
are mostly ignored in a stream of studies about the impact of trade on child labor (Davies, 2005 
and Cigno et al., 2002). The effect of strict regulation by using different types of penalties is still 
questioned in case of production of differentiated goods because these effects depends upon the 
firm's production process which relatively affects the productivity of child labor and adult labor 
(Estevez, 2011). 
 
The trade literature suggests that if a country engaged in the trade of homogeneous 
goods, then unskilled labor force is demanded especially in the traditional agricultural sector. 
As a result, the demand for the child labor in the economy increases. On the contrary, another 
stream of studies deliberately deviates from the conventional trade theory to new trade theory 
and postulate that highly skilled and well-educated workers are required to produce differentiated 
goods. Therefore the trade of differentiated goods has resulted in a reduction of demand for child 
labor (Estevez and Levy, 2014). 
 
The trade of differentiated goods is not free from child labor effects. They certainly 




the trading nations, and whose responsibility is to evaluate child labor effects of trade. These 
concerns are frequently discussed in trade and child labor literature (Diller and Levy, 1997). The 
majority of studies investigates the child labor effects of trade by using traditional trade 
theories and find mixed evidence of the research. Despite the substantial number of studies that 
have investigated the child labor effects of trade, to date, only a few studies which investigate 
the impact of new trade on child labor. A large body of research, primarily in the SAARC 
region, narrates that trade appears to be a source of reduction in child labor (Topalova, 2010 and 
Ray, 2000), but recent developments in new trade theory open the new era for research (Iqbal 
et al., 2012).  
 
On this note of course, it has raised the concerns regarding the structures and processes 
generated by trade liberalization, which can affect the child labor in a monopolistic competitive 
environment. Furthermore, a paucity of research that investigates the effects of trade of 
differentiated products on child labor offers another motivation for this dissertation to embark 
upon the issue of child labor and trade. So, It will be interesting to investigate the impact of 
trade expansion and child labor, along with the nature of trade induced child labor effects.  
 
In the recent years, the impact of globalization on the child labor has started to spark both 
public and academic debates. The role of multinationals in world trade and globalization is 
increasing and the concerns regarding the child labor and development policies in SAARC and 
ASEAN regions are also mushrooming. Under these circumstances, this dissertation tries to find 






 process, its scale of production, consumption of goods and the 
number of firms in the economy. 
 
A review on a bulk of literature reveals that the current models of trade and child labor 
collectively does not address the following comprehension queries. The most prominent 
concern is the trade of differentiated products that can influence the child labor in the economy 
(Sapir, 1995). Estevez (2010) examines that there is scarcity in the trade and child labor 
literature regarding the trade liberalization that can affect the firm’s labor amelioration process, 
its scale of production, technique of productions and the number of firms in the economy. This 
research is an attempt to fill this theoretical gap by reviewing the research literature and 
articulate an expansionist theory of new trade and child labor by using trade liberalization 
affects on the demand for child labor from domestic and foreign firms. 
 
Several studies have attempted to correlate the trade and child labor in traditional trade 
theory, to the best of this study knowledge, there is a paucity of empirical studies that tries to 
systematically demonstrate the effects of trade on child labor under the new trade theory. Thus, 
this thesis is an attempt to sort out the effects of trade on the child labor in the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) countries by applying the new trade theory. Now the question arises why 
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SAARC and ASEAN? There are many reasons for taking theses regions, but the most important 
reason is that the SAARC and ASEAN region are two pivotal regional platforms for economic 
cooperation in Asia. Multiple stress of accelerating population growth rates, rural to urban 
migrations and globalization is major contributing factors of child labor in SAARC and ASEAN 
regions and sensitivity of child rights issue making it an issue of priority demanding immediate 
attention. 
 
1.9  Objective of the Study 
 
The general objective of this research is to propose a trade and child labor framework under 
the new trade theory. The purpose of this framework is to give a new idea of increasing returns 
to scale and monopolistic competitive environment which allows this research to depart from 
the traditional trade and child labor models that follow the constant returns to scale and perfect 
completion. 
 
To achieve the general objectives, this research aims at addressing the following specific 
objectives: 
 
1. To investigate the empirical relationship between the trade and child labor in the major 
SAARC and selected  ASEAN countries. 
2. To assess the incidence of child labor in the presence of production and trade of 




3. To investigate the nexus between child labor and the trade induced scale, technique and 
selection effects for SAARC and ASEAN countries. 
 
1.10  Significance of the Study  
 
As far as this research concerns, this is the first step to empirically address the child 
labor effects of trade of differentiated products and is the first to provide the evidence of the 
significance of controlling the child labor by selection effect. The important aspect of the 
foregoing analysis is that it focuses on the implication of child labor penalty in a theoretical 
framework and the impact of trade liberalization on child labor by using empirical analysis in 
the markets where increasing returns and monopolistic competition prevails, policy effect yield 
selection, technique and scale effects.  
 
This thesis gives a direction to fill the gap in the literature by developing the new 
theoretical and empirical evidence of trade and child labor. Besides the empirical evidence of 
trade and child labor, this research shows the trade induced child labor effects in distinguishing 
products that can be disintegrated into a selection effect, a scale effect, and a technique effect. 
In addition, the upcoming theoretical and mathematical formulation developed in this thesis 
assumes that firms are taking part in withdrawing the child workers from the industry due to 
child labor penalty. This approach gives a new line for the researchers by incorporating the 




explores the trade induced child labor selection, scale and technique effects by using empirical 
strategy. 
 
It is hoped that the present thesis on trade and child labor will guide and stimulate the 
further work in the sphere of new trade theory. It will be  a valuable addition to the trade 
literature to control the child labor by using market forces and economics tools. Not only this 
study will give the new direction to trade policymakers in promoting the trade in the SAARC 
and ASEAN regions, but also it will support the arguments of human rights activists who want 
to eliminate the child labor. 
 
1.11  Organization of the Study 
 
This study is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 focuses on the introduction of the 
study, covering statement of the problem, significance of this thesis and description of the study 
area objectives. Chapter 2 gives a general overview of child labor in SAARC and ASEAN 
countries. A comprehensive review of the literature relevant to the issue under consideration is 
given in Chapter 3. The data used and methodology developed in this dissertation are explained 
in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the main findings of newest estimates and trends of child labor 
in SAARC and ASEAN countries. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusions, limitations and 






AN OVERVIEW OF SAARC AND ASEAN 
 
 
2.1  Chapter Overview 
 
In this chapter, a brief overview of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) economies is discussed. The 
child labor situation in selected ASEAN countries and major SAARC countries is also part of 
this chapter. Moreover, different definition of child labor and major global and selected regional 
development is also supplied in this chapter. 
 
2.2  Introduction 
 
Two important regional associations of Asia, ASEAN and SAARC, consist of more than 
seventeen different economies. These economies vary from each other in term of their political 
structure, degree of independence, size and performance and other socioeconomic indicators. 
However, some associations can be drawn among these regional economies. This section will 
briefly examine the overall economic structure, trade flows and patterns in the SAARC (South 





2.3  Background of the ASEAN Countries 
 
South East Asia is a rapidly growing region as a tourist destination and global hub for 
economic cooperation (Van Soolingen et al., 1995). It is the integration of two heterogeneous 
segments; insular South Asia, a string of archipelagoes to the south and east of mainland and 
mainland South Asia, a continent projection (Emmerson, 1984). Extending more 1,100 
kilometers southward from the mainland into Southeast Asia there came a Malay Peninsula; this 
is a geographic part of the mainland South Asia, and it shares many primitive and derived 
features with the surrounding islands along with ecological and cultural affinities (Dick and 
Rimmer, 1998) and thus works as an economic junction between the two regions (Terwiel, 
2013). 
 
2.3.1  Overview of ASEAN Economies 
 
Association of South East Asian Nations is a set of heterogeneous associates with 
respect to their origin, liberalization, economic performance and system of governance. These 
countries were colonies of different powers, i.e. French, Spanish and British. These countries 
adopt their legal framework of French civil law and English common law with some 
amendments according to their socio-political and cultural suitability. The performance of these 
regional economies differs markedly in term of human capital, population growth, and 





After the World War II, European oppression on the South East Asia, Indian 
Subcontinent and the Middle East, now, was ungovernable. Especially after the Japanese 
occupation of the British, Dutch and French territories shattered the image of European 
preeminence during wartime. The destabilization of European rule led to the rapid growth of 
nationalist movements in Asia especially in Indonesia and Malaya. So, these rulers have to 
liberalize the occupied areas. In the aftermath of independence the nations of Southeast Asia 
establish the Association of South East Asian Nations in 1967. 
 
Mainland South Asia is split into the countries of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, 
and Vietnam; the small city state of Singapore located off the southern tip of the Malay 
Peninsula (Miettinen et al., 2011). Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam located at the eastern chunk of 
the mainland and collectively these countries are known as Indochinese Peninsula (Emmerson, 
1984). Malaysia occupies the both mainland (Peninsular) and insular (Borneo) part of island 
Borneo island, along with the small sultanate of Brunei, the rest of insular South East Asia 
contains the archipelago nations of Indonesia and Philippines (Miettinen et al., 2011). 
 
The confederation of Southeast Asia has a major impact on the dissemination of the 
region's economic development, and it formulates uneven patterns of population progression 
and economic expansion (Dufhues et al., 2011). It anathematizes a strong sense of class 
distinction and transpires a larger discrepancy between the wealthy and poor nations (Cook and 
Pincus, 2014). The great depression of the late 1920`s and 1930`s puts a stop to the economic 




the seeds of political revolution that ended with the independence of most of the region's 
countries after World War II (Aspinall et al., 2011). However, the rise of development policies 
in the 1940`s and 1950`s made the economic development strategies of all the capitalist 
Southeast Asian States. The policies have drawn attention to the urban industrial planning 
(Berger, 2003), while agricultural development has been observed as complementary to 
industrial growth (Hort and Kuhnle, 2000). So far, these initiatives have met with mixed success 
(Berger, 2003). Indeed, international differences grew progressively (Cook and Pincus, 2014) 
and the trading patterns of the East Asian countries, however, have shifted over the time and has 
continued to be exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods (Sally and Sen, 
2011). Singapore has advanced the level of industrialization and became one of the world's 
great centers of industry and commerce (Chongvilaivan, 2012).  
 
There is a great disproportion in the development of the region (Siah et al., 2014), 
particularly between the member and nonmember of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) countries, i.e. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand have experienced significant economic development (Sharma and Chua, 2000). 
However, the economy of the Philippines has grown at a much slower rate compared to other 
ASEAN countries (Gill et al., 2007). The countries, i.e. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam could not follow the miracle path of sustainable development (Noland, 2013), that’s 





Since 1970, there are large differences in the patterns of structural change across the 
region (Serrano and Pinilla, 2014), with the cumulative growth projections in Malaysia and 
Thailand and collateral filters of labor laws allow only limited progress in the Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam (Leung and Viseth, 2005). Hunger, food insecurity and severe malnutrition are 
fundamental challenges in the pockets of even the most developed countries (Timmer, 2014), 
but, they have been especially vulnerable in Cambodia because of internal conflicts and crop 
failure and the disorder of agronomy everywhere is plainly associated with restrained land, 
functionally the landless remains poor and ultimately experiencing the great poverty and poor 
health (Sedara et al., 2002). Landlessness peasants are perhaps most serious in the Philippines 
(Melgar-Quinonez et al., 2006). 
 
Agriculture is a key source of income and an important trigger of economic growth in 
the region except Brunei and Singapore (Qiu et al., 2007). Agricultural employment, however, 
has been declining steadily due to rise in employment in the services (Park and Shin, 2012). 
More than two thirds of the workforce of Cambodia and Laos gain their livelihood directly from 
agriculture (World Bank Group, 2012), which is one of the most fundamental practices for the 
survival and wellbeing on a subsistence basis (ILO, 2006). Evidence from micro-studies of the 
ASEAN countries suggests that there is a considerable restructuring in the region toward the 
growth in industry and services (Hutton, 2003), however, these countries have still huge 





Table 1: Establishment and Systems of Governance (ASEAN) 
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Industrialization in the Southeast Asia is a primarily an indigenous phenomenon 
(Terwiel, 2013), much of the development policies have critical goals in the economies of the 
ASEAN countries (Dick and Rimmer, 1998); and, in all of them except Brunei, industry’s 
productivity has grown considerably over the period (Hutton, 2003). The most apparent 
increases have acknowledged in Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines (Vallance, 1999). 
Small-scale corporation dominates in the region, both in term of the number of workers 
employed and the number of companies and agriculture product processing industries has a 
potent role in increasing concentrations of consumer goods industries in all nations 
(Phadungkiati and Connell, 2014). The manufacture of a variety of products, headed by 
electronic, electrical and transportation equipment industry is dominant, the conspicuous 
exception is Singapore (Athukorala, 2011). Textiles and clothing are considered as major 
sectors in Thailand, Myanmar and Philippines (Ofreneo, 2012), the growth of the chemical 
industry in Thailand increases due to robustness of domestic demand (Jayanthakumaran et al., 
2013).  
 
The value of major ASEAN countries' trade is about more than one third of the United 
States of America (Péridy, 2005). The most astonishing thing is that these countries are now 
influencing the global trade by using the market powers (Aizenman et al., 2011). On the other 
hand minor ASEAN countries are struggling for getting some share of trade from the ASEAN 
region. Exports, as a percentage of the GDP, are small in Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam and 
Laos and moderately in Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, extremely large proportion in 




has got a paramount importance (Siah et al., 2014). In this aspect, Indonesian trade structure, 
dominated by oil, has been comparatively effective in expanding its exports toward, coffee, 
rubber, textiles, rattan and plywood (Basri and Hill, 2008). 
 
Table 2: Socio Economic Indicators of ASEAN Countries 
Characteristics Brunei  Cambodia Indonesia Lao 
PDR 










41126.6 945.5 3551.4 1408.3 10440.0 2587.6 54007.3 5479.8 
Exports  
(% of GDP) 
 
81.36 62.79 24.29 38.84 85.25 30.78 195.07 74.97 
Inflation 
 













0.41 14.86 246.86 6.65 29.24 96.71 5.31 66.79 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
 
In order to observe the major socioeconomic indicators like GDP growth, GDP per 
capita income, export percentage of GDP, inflation, unemployment rate and population in 




The table depicts that the trend of per capita income in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore is 
admirable as compare to the other partner,  while the GDP growth rates of Cambodia and Lao 
PDR are satisfactory. Unemployment rate of Indonesia and Philippines is high compared to 
other developing economies of ASEAN.  
 
On the other hand, Malaysia, with a trade pattern of exporting palm oil, tropical 
hardwoods, and tin, now derives the substantial part of their export income from petroleum 
products (Ramasamy and Yeung, 2007). These earnings are stimulating the country's industrial 
base (Basri and Hill, 2008; Ramasamy and Yeung, 2007). Thailand attainments are much less 
from Petro-export structure, where food and differentiated goods and services account for 
almost all of its trade (Sawyer et al., 2010). On the contrary, Brunei relies entirely on its petrol-
exports. Singapore is the only economy, which has utilized its unique geographic importance 
and the most competent human capital is available here to attract multinational corporations 
(Feridun and Sissoko, 2011). 
 
Cambodians per capita income is expeditiously increasing, but it is very low as 
compared to other regional countries (Murakami, 2013). In 2010, Cambodian real per capita 
income was $2,470 (purchasing power parity) and nominal per capita income was $1,040 (UN 
ESCAP, 2010). Agriculture sector required substantial restructuring due to vast potential; most 
of rural households are dependent on agriculture and complementary sub-sectors (Sedara et al., 




rubber (Sotharith, 2011). Tourism is considered as a fastest growing industry in Cambodia, with 
arrivals increasing from 0.2 million to over 2 million in recent years (Kelsall and Seiha, 2014). 
 
Indonesia has an assorted economy in which both the private and public sectors are 
playing a growing and dynamic role in strategic adaptation of policies to control the feasible 
growth path. The country is an unprecedented economy of scale and dramatically increasing 
throughput and reducing the cost of the product as compared to other countries of Southeast 
Asia (Basri and Hill, 2008). Indonesia is the 27
th
 biggest exporting country in the world 
(Durotoye, 2014) and the leading export commodities are oil and gas, plywood, rubber, 
electrical appliances, and textiles (Yusoff and Febrina, 2014). The gross domestic product is 
about $1 trillion due to this huge share of the industrial sector, Indonesia is now a significant 
member of G-20 major economies (Felman et al., 2014), it is the world’s 10 largest by real 
GDP, and its share in global economic output is 2.3 per cent (Laksmana, 2011). The industry 
sector is the economy's leading sector contributing 46% of annual GDP, the second substantial 
sector is services sector, having a share of 39% in the economy’s total income and another 
significant segment of the economy is an agricultural sector, adding 14% income to economy 
annually (WDI, 2012). However, the service sector has engaged 48.87% of the total labor force 
more people than other sectors, traditional agriculture sector is giving chance to 38.3% of the 
entire labor force and industry sector occupying 12.79 % of the overall labor force (Wahid and 
Furuholt, 2012). The population of Indonesia is more than 237 million, with a 1.9% population 
growth. Java is the world most populous island and 58% of the population lives in Java. The 




The economy of the Philippines is one of the leading economy in the world and its rank 
is 75th, with an estimated gross domestic product $272.02 billion in 2013 (Nalla and Mamayek, 
2013). The major exported items are semiconductors and electronic products, copper products, 
garments, petroleum products, transport equipment, fruit, and coconut oil. Multinationals in 
newly industrialized country are facing the dilemma of whether and when they can engage their 
capital. That’s why the Philippines' economy is in evolutionary stage and has transitioned from 
agriculture to services and manufacturing (Athukorala, 2011). Labor force is around 37 million 
and mostly engaged in agriculture sector. The agriculture sector is giving the employment to 
34.84% of the entire labor force, while contributing to GDP only about 16.12%. The industrial 
sector is facilitating 14% of the workforce and accounts for 29.8 % of GDP. At the same time, 
the 46.7% of the workers participating in the services sector are adding 55.9% of GDP 
(Bayangos and Jansen, 2011). 
 
After Indonesia, Thailand is the second major socioeconomic player of the Southeast 
Asia; Thailand is a transformative industrialized country (Nguyen and Pham, 2011), and export 
dependent economy, export to GDP ratio is virtually increasing from 1960 (Sachdev, 2013). 
The share of industrial and service sector is more than 40 per cent (Nguyen and Pham, 2011), 
which highest in the entire GDP (Sachdev, 2013). Thailand’s agricultural sector is a traditional 
sector (Rigg et al., 2012), which produces 8 per cent of GDP (Tongzon, 2002). The trade of 
logistics and communication sectors account for 13% and 10 % of gross domestic product 




Other sectors i.e. the education, financial, hospitality, telecommunication sector accounts for 
about one fourth of the country's gross domestic product (Gödecke and Waibel, 2011).  
 
2.3.2  Child Labor in ASEAN 
 
The ASEAN countries deserve rebuke for its working children during the past few decades, 
Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines are laced with child labor problem in this 
region. The IPEC finds out that Indonesia and Thailand involve extreme risks of child labor due 
to uncertainties and poverty. While Cambodia and Philippines pose extreme child labor 
complicity risks due to low scale industries (ILO, 2003). 
 
It is generally believed that Cambodia’s economic growth and development are a causal 
factor to the increase in the child labor. The dramatic increase in the demands of the 
construction is one example where construction industry has pushed children to work in brick 
kilns, foreclosing the opportunity of schooling for most of them (Ang et al., 2012). ILO (2003) 
reported that one in every ten children in the Phnom Pehn, the capital and largest city of 
Cambodia, above the age of seven years is involved in child domestic labor; young children 
have to work in the field work as scavengers and spend their time for rummaging in dumps for 
items that can be sold (Kim, 2011). Some children spend their time in the streets peddling. The 
tourist industry is also playing a key role in this form of child labor as many tourists are willing 
to buy from children, out of good intentions and social responsibility, mounting the demands. 




(Maeve, 2011). World Bank (2008) confirms that 48% children from aged 5 to 14 are not 
attending the school and they are economically active (Kim, 2011). Many of these children have 
to work long hours and approximately 79,000 children between the ages of 6 to 17 worked 25 
hours a week and did not attend the school (Despotis, 2005). When children are out of school, 
they are denying the skills and knowledge needed for state development. Without vital life skills 
and training, they are vulnerable to abuse and misuse, which may complicate and exacerbate the 
cycle of poverty in their families. Consequently, this lack of education will hold back economic 
growth in Cambodia. There is a need to re-estimate the child labor in Cambodia because child 
labor could be missing out on education (Kim, 2011). 
 
There are more than three million children involved in hazardous work in the Philippines. 
Out of 29.8 million children aged 5 to 17, 45% are doing taught work and mostly boys are 
engaged in hazardous work (Gamlin et al., 2013). Sometime, these boys have jobs that place 
them in instant physical danger. These treats contain the experience of injurious chemical and 
sharp tools, that can be less recognizable but not less hazardous. Teenagers are obligatory to 
work very long time with a few breaks. Some of them are abused by their bosses, both 
substantially and psychologically (Hindman, 2009). Children in risky work are prevalent in the 





 most populous (Durotoye, 2014), and the largest Muslim population in 




(Foldvari et al., 2013). A significant effort has been made in expanding the access to school 
education, still, more than 4 million school age children do not attend school (Kis-Katos and 
Sparrow, 2011). Most of teenagers enter the workforce at a very early phase, and are helpless 
for exploitation in the worst form of child labor (Sen, 2013). Recent estimates indicate that there 
are more than 2.7 million children engaged in repeated antisocial acts with some involved in the 
worst form of child labor (Sim et al., 2013). 
 
Thailand has made considerable efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor, 
therefore, set a minimum age for domestic work at the age of 15. For this purpose government 
passed the parliamentary regulations for domestic workers, which offers protections for 
domestic child workers, also updated the list of dangerous work (Hepburn and Simon, 2013) 
and working circumstances banned to teenagers and change the minimum age in sea vessels 
from 15 to 17 (Ratner et al., 2014). Children in the agriculture sector are exposed to unsafe tools 
and pesticides. Most of children face such problems in the sugar cane fields, but, only a few 
children face such situations in the production of roses, rubber, and oranges (Siddiqi and 
Patrinos, 1995). Children are taking part in shrimp and seafood processing industry and are 
subject to long, late hours in hard working situations and involve in heavy lifting (Ratner et al., 
2014). Teenagers, mainly girls, sometime have to work in local services, and endure physical 
and sexual abuse from their employers (Sychareun et al., 2011). Young children are rewarded to 
fight in daring boxing called Muay Thai (Li and Wang, 2011). Teenagers are found in money 




in Thailand for commercial sexual exploitation (Sychareun et al., 2011). Children are also 
trafficked into urban areas to sell and beg on the streets (Sankharat, 2013). 
 
2.4  Background of the SAARC Countries 
 
SAARC includes eight countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Its entire population is approximately 1.64 billion, which 
represents 23% of the world population. SAARC has many distinct qualities; all ideologies, 
faiths and religions of the world are gathered here. It has an imaginative irrigated farmland in 
the world with over 66 million hectares. It has one of the oldest living civilization in the world. 
It acquires the second largest rail network in the world after the United States of America. This 
region holds 450 million people in the workforce, which is the largest of any other economic 
zone. Consumer base surpasses 750 million reporting the largest number of consumers in a 
single economic zone in the world (Herath, 2012).  
 
2.4.1  Overview of SAARC Economies 
 
As far as, the SAARC is concerned, it is considered 3rd largest economy of the world in 
term of GDP (derived at purchasing power parity) and contributing US$9. 05 trillion in global 
GDP, on the other hand, if it is observed for SAARC countries, it is at 8
th
 number having share 




world population and comprise 3.9 % of the world’s area (Knox and McCarthy, 2014 and 
Chand, 2010). 
 
Table 3: Socio Economic Indicators of SAARC Countries 





14.43 6.52 5.07 4.73 1.33 4.85 3.50 6.34 
Per Capita Income, 
(Current US$) 
 
690 950 2320 1550 5430 700 1250 2910 
Exports  
(% of GDP) 
 
5.51 20.16 38.72 23.99 111.31 10.70 12.39 22.83 
Inflation 
 

















1.81 9.38 0.04 74.98 0.02 1.67 10.86 1.23 
Population  
(Growth Rate) 
3.04 1.6 2.3 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.3 0.9 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
 
Table 3 shows that, SAARC economies are experiencing the economic crunches in the 




income of these countries. High population growth rates and poverty indexes in Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan and Nepal are changing the consumption pattern and labor composition in the 
region. Export to GDP ratios in the major SAARC countries like Bangladesh, India, and 
Pakistan are unsatisfactory for globalization. Under these circumstances there are high chances 
of child labor in these countries. 
 
All SAARC countries stock market capitalization is 3.78% of the global stock market 
capitalization. The SAARC contribution of FDI in world FDI is 3.26%. Given tranquility and 
peace, FDI can register massive expansion as enabling environment scan enable SAARC to 
capture a big share of mutual benefits for SAARC and global world (Kanungo, 2012). Table 3 
shows  a short summary of socioeconomic indicators, like GDP growth, GDP per capita income 
across, export percentage of GDP, inflation, unemployment rate and population, for the purpose 
of quick analysis of South Asian countries. The table depicts that the trend of per capita income 
in small countries i.e. Bhutan and the Maldives, is admirable as compared to major SAARC 
countries, on the other hand the inflation rates of these countries are very high. Unemployment 
rate of Afghanistan and Maldives is high compared to other economies of SAARC.  
 
At first glance, SAARC countries seem to be homogeneous set of countries in term of 
their time of independence. All the countries in the Table 4, with the exception of Bhutan and 
Nepal used to be British colonies. Afghanistan is not included in the Table 4 due to different 
socioeconomic and geographical importance. Countries which were British colonies have 




the SAARC namely; Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka differ greatly in land area, GDP, population, trade patterns and way of governance. 
They have common borders with one another and these countries have more or less similar 
level of human resources and economic development (Zaman et al., 2013). 
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India is a large country in this region with vast land area, huge population, the greater 
share of GDP and GNP in the SAARC and a large trading country as compared to other 
SAARC associates (Sharma, 2007). Pakistan and Bangladesh have some type of similar 
characteristics in this region. These two countries have identical GDP, GNP and population 
structure as compare to India. Their combined share of trade in the SAARC is comparable to 
India (Mahmood and Azhar, 2001). Sri Lanka is a small country in this region with a small 
share of total GDP, GNP, population and land area of SAARC. Trade share is also not very 
high, but Sri Lanka has its own importance in the region (Sharma, 2007). 
 
The estimated gross domestic product of Nepal for being at over approximately $19 
billion, agriculture, services and industry accounted for 36 %, 48%, and 15% respectively of the 
entire GDP. While the industry and agriculture sector is contracting, the involvement of the 
service sector is increasing in domestic income. Agriculture sector holds 76% of the labor force, 
services sector employs 18.1% and manufacturing carries industry 6.2%. Agricultural yield 
includes rice, corn, tea, sugarcane, root crops, milk, wheat, and buffalo meat. Industrial sector 
generally involves the processing of agricultural products, including grain, tobacco, sugarcane, 
and jute. Its labor force is roughly 10 million suffers from a shortage of trained labor (WB, 
2014). Nepal’s economic growth adversely affected by the political instability, 4.9 % GDP 
growth rate in 2010-11 is considered to be the second highest rate in the post-conflict period 
(Shakya et al., 2012). Domestic income comes  mostly from agriculture, construction, financial 
and other services. The percentage of deprived persons have dropped in recent years. The 




seven years (Price and Bohara, 2013). Nepal has considerable potential of tourism due to 
spectacular landscape and diverse, colorful culture, but progress in tourism and hospitality 
industry has been lifted by political instability and inadequate infrastructure. The tourism 
industry is contributing nearly 3% in domestic income and is the second biggest source of 
foreign income after remittances (Gautam, 2011). Nepal’s exports of mainly leather goods, 
hemp natural fiber, clothing, carpets, grain and jute goods total $886 million. Import 
commodities of mainly gold, petroleum products, machinery and equipment and fertilizer total 
2 billion US dollar (Thapa, 2012). 
 
The countries of the SAARC region are at the similar stage of economic development. The 
share of the manufacturing sector is increasing in major SAARC countries. Each country has a 
specific role in the specialization of a narrow range of products. The specialization of a 
narrow range of products will not only source of cost effectiveness, but also improves the 
quality of their products (Batra, 2006). This dissertation will consider data from major South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries, namely, Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. These countries have a major share in population and economy 
of the region. Approximately, more than 93% share of the whole region is captured by these 
countries. These countries have enough capacity to represent the whole region. Another reason 
of using major SAARC countries in our research is that the data base of these countries is well 
organized and reliable as compare to other countries. The other countries Afghanistan, Bhutan, 





The SAARC region has huge capacity to make itself an effective trading bloc in the 
world. The share of SAARC countries in world population is about 23 percent and considered a 
large market with massive profit making opportunities. But the performance of these countries 
is unsatisfactory if this region compares with the trade performance of other regional alliances. 
After comparing the SAARC(South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) and the 
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) regions, Batra (2006) comes to know that 
the performance of the SAARC region is unsatisfactory. By engaging in trade on the basis of 
product differentiation and economies of scale (due to large scale production), these countries 
can gain from the trade of differentiated products (Akram and Mahmood, 2012). Economists in 
the SAARC think that today`s South Asia has a variety of common characteristics with the 
Europe of the nineteen century. Development of international institutions, rising nationalism 
and regional associations are new sense of political and economic interaction (Anderson, 2000). 
The mode of trade is also changing due to trade reforms in the world, accordingly, trade of 
differentiating goods is becoming popular in this region (Weeraratne, 2005). 
 
2.4.2  Child Labor in SAARC 
 
The number of child workers in SARRC countries falls by some 10 million. 
Notwithstanding this performance, at the end of 2010 there were still over 21.6 million child 
workers, and half of them were engaged in unsafe work. The overall falling trends could not 
stop the rising numbers of children in economic activity in South Asia from 2006 to 2012 (ILO-




international community, they also give a clear expression of hope progress against the child 
labor is attainable, with substantial policy choices and massive commitment in the national and 
international level. Commitment to national and international level can only be possible due to 
trade openness in SAARC countries (Deacon et al., 2011). 
 
Approximately 95% of child workers live in developing countries of which half of them 
belong to Asian developing countries. Within Asia, South Asia has a high frequency of child 
labor and this differ significantly between countries (Herath and Sharma, 2012). In SAARC 
countries, the incidence of child labor tends to be higher among boys than girls and in rural 
areas. A numerous participation rate for boys in the workforce is due to the fact that girls 
perform their duties in the informal sector (such as at home) which are challenging to capture by 
statistics (Fallon and Tzannatos, 1998). Urban children generally work on carpet, garment and 
textile related activities, small business and beedi (hand- rolled cigarette) industry together with 
their parents, at the same time, children in rural areas tend to work with their families in fishing, 
agriculture, forestry or small family ventures (Singh, 2005). 
 
Child labor exhibits 12% of the entire labor force in Bangladesh. With the children 
engaged in economic exercises, 16.12 % are factory workers, 22.90% are seller/vendors, 5.71% 
are brick/stone breakers, 2.26% is in craft, 4.76% agricultural worker, 0.48% beggars and 
0.68% in fish processing (Fassa, 2003). It is examined that practically 60% of child workers 
are engaged in the agriculture sector and 8% of the workers employed in the hand knotted 




In Nepal, 90% of child workers are engaged in agriculture and household work and the 
rest of 5% are working in non-agricultural activities, including service and manufacturing 
industries (Bhukuth and Ballet, 2006). Of those who are engaged in non-agriculture sector, 
1.8% is in transportation, communication and construction, 0.8% work as general technical 
workers and another 0.4% as sales workers and 0.8% work as production workers. There is a 
higher concentration of child labor in Nepal if compared with other countries in South Asia. 
Multiple indicator cluster surveys (MICS) and other state surveys found that 34.14% of children 
between the ages of 5-14 are involved in child labor, if it is compared with the South Asia 
region as a whole it is 12.04%. There are more young girls than boys are engaged in child labor 
activities, and the working conditions are worse in rural areas. The agricultural sector  occupies 
89% of the working children, while 1.38% of employed children are in the manufacturing 
sector, 0.31% child workers are part of the construction industry, 1.57% are working in 
wholesale and retail trade, 1.0% are laboring in hotline industry, and 7% are in other industries 
(UNICEF, 2012). 
 
In Pakistan, 12% in manufacturing, 66% of child labor is found in agriculture and 
remaining 22% works in service related activities (Rosati and Rossi, 2001). It is evident 
that in South Asia most working children are found in non-tradable rather than in tradable 
sector and most of them are employed in agriculture along with their parents. The worse thing 
is that most of employed children work together with their parents, they are projected to 
danger in most circumstances. In agriculture sector, most children are exposed to toxic 




such as mercury, benzene and asbestos. There is no doubt that these work hazards affect 
children with physical and mental development during their formative years (Sharma, 2007). 
 
The international community has serious concerns regarding child labor in SAARC 
region. The situation of child labor is different in different countries (Hidellage and Srivastava, 
2012). Male children from the age of 10 to 15 are engaged in militant activities in Afghanistan 
and Pakistani areas adjacent to Afghanistan (Asal et al., 2008), as the developed states make 
their front doors less accessible this area for emergence of globalization in the form of increased 
openness through trade liberalization (Cochran, 2013). Similarly, the other countries like India 
and Bangladesh male children are taking part in dangerous activities, but, female from 10 to 15 
years are pushed into prostitution business (McClarty et al., 2014). Militancy for boys and 
prostitution for girls both are associated with serious human rights violation in SAARC region 
(Mehdi, 2010). Trade liberalization is a tool which can bring the children out of the child 
humiliation in South Asia (Mansoor, 2004). 
 
2.5  Major Developments in Child Labor Reduction 
 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) have directed their considerations to the reduction of child labor worldwide. As a 
result of their contributions there have been significant cosmopolitan treaties and conventions, 
impeding child labor and diagnosing concrete measures for governments to adhere. Once a state 




Table 5: Key Achievements of the ILO to Combat Child Labor 
Year ILO Conventions 
1973 
The key instrument of minimum age was adopted for admission to employment (15 or the age 




The UN approved the convention on the rights of the child, determining the right of the child to 
be protected from hazardous work and economic exploitation, and the refraining of regimes 
from engaging any person under 15 into the armed forces. 
1999 
ILO members mutually approved the convention concerning the immediate and prohibition 




The ILO produces its first comprehensive report on child labor and declared 12 June as world 
day against child labor. This arrangement supports more than 80 countries in formulating their 
own programs to control the child labor. 
2004 
First ILO worldwide study of the costs and benefits of eradicating child labor says that benefits 
would exceed the costs by nearly 6 to 1. 
2006 
The findings of the second global report on child labor an hope for the future, which says that 
child labor is declining worldwide, the ILO projected a worldwide campaign to wipe out the 
worst forms of child labor by 2016. 
2009 
The 183 ILO Member States mutually accept the Global Jobs Pact as a guide to recovery from 
the worldwide jobs and economic crunch. The Pact calls for overblown surveillance to attain the 
eradication and prevention of an increase of child labor, forced labor and discrimination at work. 
2010 
The ILO, published its third Global Report on Child Labor, warning that the pace and profile of 
development is not expeditious to attain the 2016 targets of eradicating the worst forms of 
extensive child labor. 
Source: International Labor Organization Conventions (Various Years)  
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The South and Southeast Asian countries are devoted to defeat the child labor, and this 
apart from different actions taken by individual countries of the SAARC and ASEAN. The ILO 
members in the SAARC and ASEAN region have ratified some of the ILO legal frameworks 
and the other conventions for eliminating child labor. 
 
Cambodian state had ratified the convention 138 on the minimum age in 1999, and 
specified the minimum age to work to be the age of 14. Cambodian government signed the 
convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor in 2006, it is a remarkable step towards the 
elimination of the worst forms of child labor in Cambodia. In spite of this, a significant number 
of children to be found in Cambodian labor market (Kim,2011).  
 
Indonesian government established a national action committee on the establishment of 
the worst form of child labor in 2001, and prepared a national action plan for the reduction of 
the worst forms of child through a three phase program over the next twenty years. The plan 
constitutes a time bound program to eradicate the worst forms of child labor. The legal 
committee of the national action plan has since taken steps to the legal framework to stop the 
child labor and child exploitation (Bessell, 2011).  
 
Thailand has made considerable efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor, 
therefore, set a minimum age for domestic work at 15 years. For this purpose government 
passed the parliamentary regulations for domestic workers, which offers protections for 




and working circumstances banned to teenagers and change the minimum age in sea vessels 
from 15 to 17 (Ratner et al., 2014). 
 
The Philippine has made a considerable progress in the efforts of child labor reduction in 
2014. The national child labor committee (NCLC) is one of the milestones to eradicate the child 
labor in the Philippines. NCLC is an operational framework to finalize the strategic plan against 
child labor. Moreover, Philippine also rectified the all international conventions on child labor, 
i.e. ILO C. 182, Worst Forms of Child Labor, UN CRC Optional Protocol on Armed Conflict, 
Palermo Protocol on Trafficking in Persons, ILO C. 138, Minimum Age and UN CRC Optional 
Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (US Department of 
Labor, 2015) 
 
In 2013, Sri Lanka made feasible efforts to eradicate the child labor in 2013. National 
Steering Committee (NSC) reactivated to eliminate the child labor in all 25 districts, 755 Child 
Protection Committees are activated all over the Sri Lanka, and the main motive of this project 
is to make Sri Lanka, a child labor free country by 2016. Except Palermo Protocol on 
Trafficking in Persons, Sri Lanka ratified the all well-known conventions to eliminate the child 























Afghanistan     
Bangladesh     
Bhutan     
Brunei      
Cambodia      
India     
Indonesia      
Laos     
Malaysia     
Maldives     
Myanmar     
Nepal     
Pakistan     
Philippines     
Singapore     
Sri Lanka     
Thailand     
Vietnam     
 
Source: Various International Labor Organization Conventions  
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In accordance with the Minimum Age Act, the age of working children differ between 
countries. For example, in Bangladesh the minimum age for work is 12 years, while in India 
and Pakistan, the minimum working age of 14 is practiced only to certain distinct activities 
occupations and processes (Chaturvedi, 1995). In Pakistan, the Employment of Children Act 
1991 ban the hiring of children under age of 15 in hazardous or dangerous activities. 
Strategies are also installed for enforcement and execution of the act, such as the requirement 
that all entrepreneurs maintain a register of details regarding the recruitment of any children 
under the age of 15 (Sharma, 2007). In Nepal, the minimum working age of 14 does not apply 










3.1  Chapter Overview 
 
Chapter 3 explains the literature review relevant to the child labor. It identifies, 
appraises, and synthesizes the research evidence and arguments. Moreover, this chapter 
incorporates the current knowledge in the field of both trade and child labor, including 
substantive findings, as well as theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to 
situate the current research within the body of literature. 
 
3.2  Introduction  
 
A voluminous literature focuses on the new aspect of international trade and emphasizes 
the effects of market size on the international division of labor. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) 
claim that vast literature tended to focus on the determinants of child labor and explore the 
connection between international trade and the child labor. On this note, this section discusses 
the existing studies with a critical perspective, as well as provide a staccato review of earlier 




3.3  Theoretical Studies 
 
In the theoretical literature on child labor the notable contributors are Basu and Van 
(1998), Basu et al. (2010), Ranjan (2001), Baland and Robinson (2000), Jafarey and Lahiri 
(2002) and Dessy and Pallage (2005). Trade liberalization, in a developing economy, is 
generous in inefficient and disorganized labor, likely to increase the relative rate of return to 
unskilled labor, thus diminishing the satisfaction to spend on skills and education. Therefore, 
the rewards to child labor raise with a substitution effect along with an increased supply of child 
labor (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2010). Trade openness does not increase the demand for child 
workers if children generally work in sectors that compete with imports or in the nontradable 
segment. On the other hand, some economists suggest that the effects of trade openness would 
be negligible (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2009).  
 
Trade liberalization proponents advocate that economies have a desire to invest in skills 
and education in order to spur economic development and their long-run competitiveness (Tariq 
and Ab-Rahim, 2016). Ab-Rahim and Tariq (2016) examine that the trade liberalization might also 
lead to structural changes and sectoral shift from low skilled to higher skilled capital intensive 
manufacturing and services in the long run, thus making the recruitment of children less 
convenient.  
 
A greater intensity of child labor could abate costs to gain the country a competitive 




could bring about a magnified incidence of child labor all over the world. Developing 
economies with tolerant labor standards, nominal wages and a plenteous supply of unskilled 
workers, including child laborers, are regarded as a haven for foreign investors, a perspective 
called the conventional wisdom by Doepke and Zilibotti (2010). 
 
Trade liberalization in a developing country, will not only have a child labor 
substitution, but also a child labor income effect. Despite the fact that free trade is far from an 
accomplished fact and delicately assume that trade does increase the growth rate of the 
traditional economy (see Estevez, 2010) as well as, it enhances the relative rate of returns of 
incompetent workers. This child labor income effect can be expected to decline the benefits for 
parents with little skills to fire their children to work by assuming that child education and child 
leisure are normal goods (Basu and Van, 1998). 
 
Basu et al. (2010) find out that parents in poor countries use extra income to move 
children out of work. This effect of additional income occurs even in the face of increased 
earnings opportunities for children. Along these lines, the patronizing view held by so many 
wealthy country researchers, that poor country parents somehow do not bother about the 
betterment of their children seems unfounded. These directions propose that the use of punitive 
income and sanctions against poor countries, where child labor is common, may not have the 
proposed impact. When children work as a result of poverty, then punishments and sanctions 




restrict the child labor would be to supplement treatment for income generating exercises with, 
possible, additional motivation for children staying in school. 
 
The fluctuations and variations in earning channels and opportunities in developing 
economies are a cause of an increase in the demand for child workers. Labor markets arises 
from trade liberalization, some time, increase the child labor. Incidentally, children may be 
compelled to perform several activities customarily done by adults (Rees et al., 2012). 
Markusen et al. (1995) discover the association between trade liberalization and earnings 
tendencies, their arguments support the entry of foreign multinationals and earnings potentials 
of local workers. This occurs when the foreign companies apply market influence in local 
markets. However, Cigno et al. (2002) state that the trade liberalization not only affect the 
earnings opportunities of developing countries, but also increases the rich countries` capacity to 
control the policy in the poorer countries. As developing economies incorporate into the world`s 
economy and progressively depend upon world export markets to sell their goods and services, 
developed and wealthy economies can use the trade sanctions as a tool to force the policies that 
attempt to reduce the child labor (Cigno et al., 2002). Ray (2000) uses a strategic framework to 
examine the effect of stricter child labor policy on research and development when consuming 
labor-intensive. Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) shows that when countries set child labor 
regulations in a non-cooperative setting, a country benefits from a stricter policy abroad when it 
has high product standards at home. In a subsequent study, Rogers and Swinnerton (2008) 
analyzes the implications of non-cooperative child labor policy for local production externalities 




Similarly, Webbink et al. (2012) uses a strategic framework to examine the effect of 
stricter child labor policy on research and development and obtain a broad overview of the 
degree to which children in different regions of Asia and Africa are involved in different forms 
of child labor. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006) present a trade and child labor model, the study 
justifies the Ben-Porath (1980) in that he focuses on the investigation of the effects of trade 
policy on child labor. In a subsequent study, Edmonds (2007) analyzes the implications of child 
labor policy for local production externalities and concludes that impact international trade on 
the child labor is not clear. The study extends previous investigations that examine the link 
between child labor policy and modern international trade.  
 
Krueger (1996) has indicated that in Heckser-Olin framework, it is assumed that, 
developing countries are abundant in unskilled labor therefore these countries have comparative 
advantages in unskilled labor. Sign and Zammit (2004) find out that trade liberalization may not 
only provide the comparative advantages in unskilled labor intensive sectors for the developing 
economies, but also brings a comparative erosion of labor standards and adaptation of less labor 
intensive technology with high labor intensive techniques known as race to bottom hypothesis. 
The long term capital transfers from developed economies to developing economies plays an 
important role in comparative advantage. It is noteworthy that weak labor laws, low wage rates, 
lax labor standards and abundant supply of unskilled labor, including child workers are viewed 
as a haven for foreign investor. A country can gain comparative advantage on labor intensive 
goods by using a higher extent of child labor through cutting labor costs. Growth with the 




earnings (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006). As the wage rate of children engaged in the economic 
activity increases, the cost of opportunity for children to go to the school also increases. This 
relief supports the arguments of the parents about sending their children to work (Ranjan, 
2001). 
 
The new trade theory postulate that trade of differentiated products tends to be prevalent 
between countries that are similar in their factor endowments, technology level, skill levels, and 
so on. Thus, the trade of differentiated products will be the dominant trade pattern especially 
between countries at a similar level of economic development. It has been established that gains 
from trade will be large when economies of scale are strong and trade goods are highly 
differentiated (Krugman, 1980). Product differentiation and economies of scale that has internal 
to a firm thus formed the basis of the trade of differentiated products. 
 
Krugman (1991) uses a two-region model to examine sector vise competition in labor 
demand in an imperfectly competitive market with increasing returns to scale. Krugman’s 
theoretical model shows that competition in labor demand may result in driving the labor out of 
the market when the cost of labor is high enough. Notten et al. (2012) uses two regions to 
examine different levels of competition in labor behavior in an imperfectly competitive market. 
Their theoretical work shows that competition in poor countries may result in either driving the 





Role of unskilled labor in trade is also very important and such type of framework based 
on new trade theory is advanced by Egger et al. (2007). The authors build a two country model 
of skilled and unskilled labor, which assumes monopolistic competition. The framework 
examines the effects of trade in intermediate products on unskilled labor, output level and 
welfare under the conditions of the endogenous tax and skilled to unskilled labor functions. The 
framework provides interesting insights into the effects of trade in intermediate goods on the 
foreign unskilled labor level.  
 
In the investigations of the “race to the bottom” in child labor protection laws, the 
evidence to support the hypothesis remains mixed. The “race to the bottom” concept, an 
offshoot of the inverted u-shaped child labor curve hypothesis, suggests that developing nations 
compete in lowering the stringency of child labor regulations in efforts to attract foreign 
investments from more developed nations. Developed countries are assumed to relocate the 
labor-intensive industries to avoid stricter labor standards at home (Bigelow, 1997). Singh and 
Zammit (2004) conclude that a “race to the bottom” in child labor policy is unlikely for both 
small and large countries, when standard intervention applies. However, the paper suggests that 
the relaxation of the assumption of immobile factors implies the possibility that freer trade 
induces capital flight from more developed countries with stricter child labor regulations to less 
developed countries with weaker regulations.  
 
Singh and Zammit (2004) asserts that studies which provides empirical evidence to 




possibility of the race to the bottom in child labor policies among the developed nations. It is 
the primary argument of many anti-trade liberalization and workers’ rights that trade 
liberalization results in a race-to-the-bottom
13
. These activists are supportive of the belief that 
free trade generates additional encouragement for competitive advantage, resulting in increased 
child labor to get the lowest labor rate possible. In the motivation for low cost labor, developing 
countries with weak labor regulations and abundant unskilled labor pools including children, are 
prime targets for corporations competing in the global economy (Singh and Zammit, 2004).  
 
To date, Singh and Zammit (2004) is a unique study that proposes a general equilibrium 
analysis based on traditional trade and their study finds little support for the race to bottom 
arguments. There is some evidence that more openness increases the level of income, 
compliances with minimum wages, and reduces child labor. The authors developed a 
framework consistent with the Heckscher Ohlin model of international trade, but there is no 
model or framework for monopolistic completion to examine the effect of domestic child labor 
regulation.  
 
Capital and labor market imperfections strengthen the underdevelopment trap of 
developing countries (Alan, 2011). Kaplan (2012) and Chamley (2012) examines the multiple 
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equilibriums in the labor markets in poor developing countries due to interest rates. Van 
Binsbergen et al. (2012) argue that lower interest rates, offer better access to credit due to trade 
liberalization, may increase the employment and earnings opportunities available to poor 
households of a developing nation. But, Kanungo (2012) has a diverse opinion on this issue; he 
claims that trade liberalization attracts the foreign investor in developing countries and 
increases in the demand for local labor. Child labor and adult labor are substitutes (substitution 
axiom) thus low cost child labor is regarded as an utopia for foreign investors. Willis (1973) 
says “labor demand, expands the earnings opportunities of children” (Serra, 2009). Child leisure 
and child education are normal goods, but child labor is a luxury commodity to the poor 
households (luxury axiom); old age security of the parents behind the incidence of high 
backward society is a source of high fertility rate and lower investment in the education (Basu 
et al., 2010). Ventevogel et al. (2013) has found a justification in the need for old age security 
of the parents behind the tendency of the severe fertility rate and petty investment in the 
education of their children (and hence the high incidence of child labor) in a poverty-stricken 
community where the child labor rate is considerably high. Thus, it is recommended an 
improvement in legislation of compulsory education and health care services to eliminate child 
labor from the system. 
 
Trade openness could thus be linked with a decreased incidence of child labor. Another 
probably positive effect of trade openness on the frequency of child labor through the effect of 
openness on interest rates and credit constraints. More open economies are likely to have lower 




and thereby the intensity of child labor (Guarcello et al., 2010). From a political perspective, an 
open economy has less encouragement to secure the prominent traditional culture and 
institutional framework that endorses the child labor (Neumayer and De Soysa, 2005). Trade 
liberalization might be delaying the decision duration of the factors that regulate the child labor 
supply. Cultural and societal standards are more glamorous in developing economies, leading to 
a higher social acceptability of child labor (Neumayer and De Soysa, 2005). But the awareness 
level of parents naturally converges to natural norms, the social acceptability of child labor 
incidence reduces due to the trade liberalization. Subsequently, they may prefer sending their 
children to an educational institute instead of engaging them in work. Trade liberalization has 
an effect on the labor market adjustment and ethic in developing countries. 
 
The financier and capital owner made their decision according to world market trends 
and have a low level of reliance on the local supply of inexperienced and immature labor, 
including children (Serra, 2009). In economies where the trade intensities are very low, efficient 
and skilled workers and the owners of capital naturally benefit from preserving the institutional 
culture. While, poor legislative conditions encourage the supply of low-priced unskilled labor, 
including that of children (Neumayer and De Sousa, 2005). If child labor is officially banned, 
but continues to exist due to lack of enforcement, then as Berik and Rodgers (2010) has noted 
violations of labor standards are more economical in the non-tradable and less exports oriented 
sectors. Berik and Rodgers (2010) had also found that the prevalence of child labor declines 
sharply with national income. According to them, the use of child labor is negatively related 




have more strictly controlled labor standards and better working conditions. Regulatory 
authorities of developing countries often have a scarcity of resources to implement the child 
labor bans. 
 
Foreign venture capitalist and investors might be less involved in exploiting low-cost 
labor, including child labor. Market stability, market size and market expansion, economic and 
political stability, infrastructure and high labor expertise are also essential in determining the 
child labor (Hagestad and Uhlenberg, 2006). Most of the empirical studies typically fail to 
interrogate that, economies with lax labor standards in general and a gigantic incidence of child 
labor in particular attract a greater inflow of FDI (Brown et al., 2012). In as much as foreign 
direct investment spurs economic development (Herath, 2012), it also has a catchy effect for 
reducing the incidence of child (Brown et al., 2012). Foreign investors might also think it more 
problematic to avoid anti-child labor laws as they are apparently under great interrogation of 
executors and doubtlessly more exposed to the authorities of trade unions, consumer, human 
rights, the media and other opposition groups (Davies and Voy, 2009). 
 
Banerjee and Nag (2013) collaborate the child labor and trade liberalization in two basic 
ways. First, trade liberalization may raise the earnings and employment potentials to poor 
families in developing economies. Variations in domestic labor markets from trade 
liberalization may decline or incline the child labor. Second, trade liberalization enhances the 




can increase jobs and income in poor countries because of penetration of international 
investment or increases in the value of developing countries’ export products.  
 
It is observed that the governments of developing countries are coerced by the 
developed world about child labor policies. Pressure of wealthy nations can be effective in 
dropping the child labor when developing countries infiltrate into the global economy 
(Edmonds and Turk, 2002). Governments can reduce the child labor by giving grants to 
education facilitators and encouraging the children to go to school instead of work. For this 
purpose, compulsory schooling can be used as an instrument for regulatory authorities to stop 
children from working (Lopez-Calva, 2002). 
 
When a country opens its borders for getting the access to the international markets, the 
foreign investment often, but not always, come into the country. This is the cause of an increase 
in the demand for local labor and hence increase the real wage rate. In addition, nowadays some 
developing countries have a comparative advantage in agriculture goods, and integration into 
international markets may increase the price of the export product to international levels. Thus, 
trade liberalization may increase employment and wages in these sectors (Davies and Voy, 
2009). Trade liberalization can change the decisions of the factors that determine the child labor 
supply. Social mobility and cultural influence, are more influential and traditions in developing 





Ray (2000) for Pakistan, Weeraratne (2005) for Sri Lanka, Kanungo (2012) for 
Bangladesh, Rees et al. (2012) for India, Dorji and Gyeltshen (2013) for Bhutan, consequently, 
Herath (2012), Singh and Zammit (2004), and Kaplan (2012) find that trade liberalization is one 
of the most common policy prescriptions offered to initiate the process of poverty eradication in 
today’s poor countries. They agree on a single point that growth is likely the most important 
channel through which trade might lower poverty in the long run. These studies have 
emphasized the importance of short to medium run consequences of trade reforms. This focus is 
in part motivated by restricting mobility of individuals across regions and industries within 
poverty-stricken economies as a result of massive trade policy shocks differential impact of 
trade on poverty across regions and industries within poor economies that persist over a long 
period after the reforms. A high level of child labor coupled with low school attendance rates 
and income levels. For example, in India and Pakistan, 7-10 percent children of age 10-14 
report working as their usual principal activity and 98 percent of these working children do not 
attend school at the beginning (Boockmann, 2010).  
 
Trade reforms, by differently altering the local economic environment in which families 
operate and the resources available to families, might affect the parents’ decision to invest in 
children. When the awareness level of parents converges to global norms (via trade 
liberalization), the general acceptability of child labor decreases due to social proliferation. As a 
result, these changes, parents start sending their children to school instead of work. Trade 
liberalization also affects the labor market regulations and standards in developing countries. 




Edmonds (2010) and Ray and Chatterjee (2012) emphasis on the effects of child labor 
and agricultural trade liberalization in a framework where adolescent frequently work on a 
family farm. This is not astonishing given that highest level of child labor worldwide rise in 
family farms or non-traded sectors. However, some advocates that trade liberalizations in 
agricultural sector (particularly in economies where a huge population depends on self-
employed agriculture) might yield specific case studies because income effects linked with self-
employed agriculture sector might have a tremendously meaningful role that would not be as 
pronounced during a trade reform. In addition, Dorji and Gyeltshen (2013) propose that the 
child work for compensation, rather than work on their clan and family farm, is the kind of job 
that interrupts most with schooling and thus it is a matter of greater policy interest. These are 
certainly disputed claims, the trade liberalization permit us to check out whether and how an 
economy-wide trade behaviors transfer in a country with relatively developed non-agricultural 
sector, and thus a tremendous tendency for children to engage themselves for wages in 
nonagricultural sector, affects child labor and schooling preferences. 
 
The effect of trade, on hiring the children as labor in poor, especially agricultural 
economies have started an unmelodious debate. Research which reflects the analysis of actual 
data from developing countries and mathematical modeling both come to the general conclusion 
that poverty is the root of all evil, not capitalism or trade liberalization (Edmonds, 2010). 
Poverty limits access to education which has been shown to decrease child labor and improve 
the economic wellbeing of families. Through improved opportunities for education, greater 




child labor volumes. The remedy of child labor is not very simple, but it is something that will 
take continued development and dedication to free trade and to trade liberalization overcome. 
Just as developed nations overcame their legacy of child labor through greater economic 
expansion, higher wages, and increased education opportunities, the developing world will be 
able to do so in the future as well (Edmonds and Schady, 2009).  
 
If poverty is a major cause of child labor and children have to work either for the income 
or they cannot afford school fees, than the trade improvements in earnings opportunities can 
reduce child labor. When one child makes more in a poor family as a result of trade promotion, 
than other children of the same family may be able to stop working and they may be in a better 
position to attend school. Additionally, the increase in the parental earnings may support the 
family to reduce the work of school going children. Parents can get the substitutes for those 
goods which are produced by children previously, or they can utilize their increased income to 
alternative income earned by their children previously. Hence, trade liberalization is a best tool 
to help the parents in poor countries and stop the child labor without foreign intervention (Islam 
and Choe, 2013).  
 
In the conventional literature, the supply of child labor has been attributed to factors 
such as failure of the educational system, the objectives of households to maximize present 
income, a dualistic economy characteristic of developing countries with the coexistence of 
formal and informal sectors. However, it is without any ambiguity that the root cause is helpless 




to go out in the labor market and earn their own means of livelihood. To eradicate the incidence 
of child labor, World Development Reports called for a multifaceted approach with programs 
that increase income security, reduce costs of education, and improve the quality schooling 
(Basu et al., 2010). 
 
Emerson and Souza (2011) examine that labor market interventions raise adults’ wages 
are expected to mitigate the problem of child labor. Ranjan (2001), Baland and Robinson (2000) 
and Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) are some unique studies which focus on capital market failure and 
emphasize the importance of capital-market imperfection as a contributing factor to inefficient 
child labor. On the other hand, Dessy and Pallage (2005) has advocated in favor of the 
imposition of compulsory education as a means to combat the incidence of child labor. Dessy 
and Pallage (2005) has shown that in an economy where the benefits of having children are 
outweighed by rearing costs, a policy of free education with no compulsory education laws, 
may lead the economy to an underdevelopment trap with a high fertility rate and higher 
incidence of child labor. On the other hand, an obligatory educational policy is expected to 
abate the presence of the child labor evil from the system.  
 
The supply side mainly results from phenomenon such as poverty, education, household, 
and government decisions. The income levels of countries play a very critical role and has a 
strong link between the incidence of child labor and household income (Fallon and Tzannatos, 
1998; Udry, 2006). Most studies noticed that the poverty of the household is an important factor 




avouch that poverty expedite the parents send their children to work since they do not see any 
substitutes. It is usually acknowledged that when the society is characterized by poverty and 
inequality, then the, incidence of child labor tends to increase (Bekele and Boyden, 1988; 
Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995). Krueger (1996) has found that the acuteness of child labor fell 
sharply with national income. He concluded that the child labor is negatively related to 
economic development. Moreover, the regulatory authorities of rich economies suggest to have 
stricter labor standards and better working conditions. The regulators of developing economies 
often absence of resources to enforce child labor laws. The anti- trade liberalization elements 
argue that market integration, augmenting the labor demand, enhance the earnings opportunities 
of young workers and thereby necessarily leads to more child labor. Some opponents of trade 
liberalization recommend the practice of trade sanctions against the exporting countries as a 
way to eliminate the child labor (Kis-Katos and Sparrow, 2011). 
 
One reason frequently cited in inconclusive evidence in the study of trade child labor 
linkages is the lack of theoretical underpinnings to ground empirical prediction of the trade and 
child labor relationships (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006). More recently, formal theoretical 
frameworks have been advanced to provide a basis for empirical hypothesis. In particular, the 
theoretical framework developed by de Bell et al. (2007), based on the Hecksher Olin type trade 
model, provides an explicit description of the child labor impact of inter industry trade. An 
important contribution of the de Bell et al. (2007) framework is the formal presentation of the 
child labor impact of trade due to income effects or trade induced child labor technique due to 






















Figure 5: The Mechanism of Child Labor 
Source: Acaroglu and Dagdemir (2010) 
 
Recent development in modeling trade-child labor relationships contributes to providing 
theoretical underpinnings for empirical tests, most analyses are based on the traditional theory 
of trade. The Ranjan (2003) framework is based on the traditional framework of the trade, 
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which assumes constant returns to scale and perfect competition. In contrast, theoretical 
frameworks that examine the impact of trade on the child labor using modern trade theory are 
relatively scarce in the literature. There is yet a formal framework to delineate the impact of 
trade of differentiated products on child labor and to examine how structural parameters in a 
new trade model may clearly affect child labor. Futhermore, literature shows that most studies 
that are based on new trade focus on the issue of child labor policy rather than describing the 
effects of international trade on domestic child labor (Cigno et al., 2002). In particular, strategic 
behavior pertaining to the foreign capital inflow affects child labor regulation of domestic child 
labor is most typically examined (Fors, 2012). 
 
The literature review shows the various causes of the child labor along with its 
economic reasons. Moreover, this review inquires that how child labor in developing continues 
to be affected by economic growth and trade liberalization, once it exits in developing 
economies due to trade liberalization as seen in Figure 5. According to Figure 5 there are two 
dimensions which constitute a child labor mechanism for demand and supply side. Firstly, It is 
made up by the factors that determine child labor supply and child labor is defined by 
household decisions, government decisions, education (illiteracy) and poverty. Secondly, it is 
made up of those factors that affects the demand side of child labor and related to the growth 





3.4  Empirical Studies 
 
The empirical literature on demand side factors of child labor is relatively scarce as 
compared to supply side factors i.e. household factors. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain 
firm level data on child labor, which can be beneficial to validate the results of this study and 
even the survey’s reliability can be uncertain due to resistance by firms to disclose the 
information on the child labor and wages paid to these unlawful workers. Davis and Voy (2009) 
have empirically found a feeble connection between trade liberalization and child labor, by 
using instrumental variable techniques on macro level data. One of the drawbacks of macro-
level data is an absence of data for the firms which are engaged in the production of 
differentiated goods by using child labor. The unavailability of reliable data on child labor issue 
necessitates a theoretical approach. At present, empirical examination has illustrated various 
findings on whether trade improves the economic stability of the country given the adverse 
effects of child labor (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005). The authors provide evidence that child 
labor increase in the initial phase of economic growth, but decrease in the later phase of 
development. However, the interesting findings of Kambhampati and Rajan (2006) give 
impetus to further and expansive research in the area, new data and more sophisticated 
statistical methods in subsequent studies do not provide conclusive findings as to the validity of 
the inverted u-shape curve (see Basu et al., 2010).  
 
Subsequent investigations into other trade-child labor phenomena such as the race to the 




al. (2010) find that trade and investment data suggest labor-intensive industries relocate to other 
industrial countries instead of to less developed nations (LDCs). Jacobs and Graham (2010) 
found that there is no direct data on turnover among school cafeteria young workers, concludes 
that other factors such as labor standards for workers, labor training, infrastructure and political 
stability, as opposed to cost-savings from labor regulations, play more important roles in the 
relocation decisions of food processing units. However, the empirical study by Singh and 
Zammit (2004) identifies a high cognitive performance in 26 developing countries to support 
the race to bottom hypothesis. Since the empirical study by Galor (2012) is based on the 
predictions of a formal theoretical framework, the study provides more persuasive evidence to 
support the validity of the substitution effect by short-run cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Davies and Voy (2009) express child labor issue in two important ways: First, this study 
mainly addresses the trade openness, and also looks at penetration by foreign direct investment 
(FDI) defined as the stock of FDI over gross domestic product (GDP). Second, their research 
uses the labor force participation rate of 10 to 14 year old adolescent as the dependent variable 
in their main analysis, Clark (2011) examines the number of economic sectors in developing 
economies, in which expression of a child labor can be traced by using the primary school and 
the secondary school non-attendance rates. 
 
Estevez (2011) finds that the comparative static results show that the policies have a 
positive impact on the child labor reduction and increase the welfare of unskilled labor another 




economy and it has a positive impact on the return to the education and lead to a reduction in 
the child labor. It will have a positive impact on the improvement of human capital stock in the 
future and sustainable development this work is similar to Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007). 
 
Bonnal (2010) employs a panel data approach to test the link between child labor and 
international trade. The results indicate that the economies which trade more and have a higher 
stock of FDI have less child labor. Iram and Fatima (2008) use multivariable vector auto 
regression (VAR) model for investigating the causal links between FDI, openness to trade and 
the child labor. They find that openness to trade raises the exportable sector and increases the 
demand for child labor in Basu (2002) framework due to the substitution effect while in 
Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004) setting this relationship is negative due to income effect. On the 
other hand, FDI is found to lower the incidence of the child labor. Kanungo (2012) interrogate 
the impact of FDI on child labor by using instrumental variable techniques. They show that FDI 
has a negative impact on child labor, however, they identify, this is biased by the endogeneity of 
FDI, and the impact of FDI is conveyed through its impact on per capita income. 
 
Ray (2000) estimates the impact of household income on the schooling and child labor 
in Pakistan and Peru. Estimations show that child labor is negatively correlated with the 
household welfare. The interesting finding of this work is that in the case of more educated 
mother there is a less chance of child labor in Pakistan and on the other hand, in case of Peru 
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Blunch and Verner (2000) find that self-employed workers are likely to engage in 
harmful child labor and could not be able to attend school. Estimation shows that girls have to 
work more than boys. Finally, there is a small but positive relationship between poverty and 
child labor. Deb and Rosati (2001) examine the lowest income quintile of India and Ghana by 
applying multinomial logit analysis. Their analysis shows that in both countries` children who 
belong to poor families are less likely to go to school and contrast; there is a significant increase 
in the household income decrease the incidence of child labor. Rossi and Rosati (2001) find that 
household income has a positive effect on school enrollment in Pakistan. Hence, these two 
studies are very similar to each other and find the same evidence in different regions. 
 
Empirical findings such as Neumayer and De Soysa (2005) reveal that child labor is 
negatively correlated with FDI and positively associated with trade liberalization. Trade 
liberalization might be delaying the decision duration of the factors that regulate the child labor 
supply. Cultural and societal standards are more glamorous in developing economies, leading to 
a higher social acceptability of child labor. In economies where the trade intensities are very 
low, efficient and skilled workers and the owners of capital naturally benefit from preserving 
the institutional culture and legislative conditions encouraging a large supply of low-priced 
unskilled labor, including that of children. Trade liberalization can affect the sources of 
economic growth, which creates the demand for child labor. The effect of growth on child labor 





Amestoy and Crosbie (2000) use the predictions of the formal model to derive estimates 
equations for their empirical study in a single sector, and find evidence to support the claim that 
trade is not good for the child labor. More recently, Kis-Katos and Sparrow (2011) present both 
theory and empirical evidence to disclose the child labor effect. The authors find evidence to 
support the hypothesis that industries that have the most increase in the child labor sanctions the 
largest decrease in the net decrease the incidence of child labor. Empirical findings based on the 
theoretical predictions found in the studies such as Neumayer and De Soysa (2005) and 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) are more likely to provide persuasive evidence to validate trade 
child labor linkages. 
 
A recent empirical study by Chaudhuri (2011) offers an investigation into the 
relationship between trade patterns and child labor regulations under the traditional trade theory. 
The authors find that under Hechsher Oilin Vanek (1968) framework, there is statically 
significant evidence to support an empirical relationship between child labor regulations and 
trade patterns. On the other hand, Baldwin and Forslid (2010) under a monopolistic competition 
framework, find statically significant evidence to support a relationship between labor standards 
and trade of differentiated products. One shortcoming of the analysis is that the authors do not 
offer a formal framework to describe the relationship between child labor and trade variables. In 





3.5  A Concluding Remark 
 
The review of theoretical and empirical studies suggests that the trade affects the child 
labor depending on types of trade induced effects. Trade-induced child labor selection and scale 
effects deserve substantial theoretical and empirical attention due to a distinguishing 
characteristic of the new trade theory. Based on the above-discussed studies, the traditional trade 
framework shows that international trade affects the scale of economy and scale of production 
and it has an impact on child labor. New trade theory talks about the product differentiation and 
increasing returns to scale; the beauty of Krugman’s framework (1979) is that it explains the 
effect of trade on a number of firms that are engaged in the production of differentiated products 
in the home and foreign countries. Under the umbrella of Krugman framework, this study 
attempts to investigate the trade-induced child labor  selection, scale and technique effects. 
 
Literature that studies the link between the child labor and new trade focus on the issue 
of child labor policy. Most investigations into the trade-child labor relationships are based on 
the traditional theory of trade. There is no formal model that explicitly shows the impact of 
trade of differentiated products on child labor quality in the open economy context. In 
particular, the child labor impact of trade driven by economies of scale has not been explicitly 
differentiated from the child labor impact of trade driven by factor endowment differentials. 
Lastly, the theoretical and empirical analysis of the previous studies do not provide the effects 
of an increase in the stringency of child labor policy on domestic local regulatory quality levels 




studies is available that deals with the issue of international trade and child labor separately. 
Only a few studies are available that bridge the issues of both disciplines to assess their causes 
and effects. Besides, only a few studies provide the linkage between trade and child labor by 
using the framework developed by the new trade theory. To the best of undergone whilst 
studying knowledge, there is no study available for the SAARC and ASEAN region that 
examines the relationship between new trade theory and child labor. This dissertation is 
therefore an attempt to fill this gap by employing econometric methods for the purpose of 






THEORETICAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1  Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter identifies the theoretical framework to be used in the thesis. A model 
created by this research shows the principal actors involved in the production, trade and child 
labor activities. Methodology part describes the research approach, the scheme of the data 
collection and method of developing empirical scenarios finalizes this chapter.  
 
4.2  Theoretical Framework 
 
The terminology of trade liberalization is usually in practice to narrate the accelerated 
spread of global trade and investment. It has gathered the momentum at an extraordinary rate in 
the recent era of globalization, thus obliging the countries to be more interconnected (Mahmood 
and Azhar, 2001), and leaves with two options; either adapting development path immediately 
in order to gain from the prospects of prosperity (Edmonds, 2010), or blaming themselves to a 
permanent process of communicative, political, social and economic marginalization 





Figure 6: Theoretical Framework 
Source: Various Studies 
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For Asian countries, a significant number of the world's working adolescent are to be 
traced, transformation to a trade liberalization basically means two things: firstly, they have an 
ability to enhance their exports and secondly, they have a greater capacity to bring a greater 
volume of foreign direct investment (Amjad et al., 2008). 
 
The set trend shows that major technology in developing countries comes from the 
developed countries. Since there are relatively few case studies to derive a serious advancement 
on the relationship between trade liberalization and child labor. Trade and child labor literature 
tell us that child labor is essential to the competitiveness of less developed countries' industry in 
the global commercial markets. Child labor creates a competitive advantage of international 
trade in developing economies, while sometimes it discourages the foreign direct investment 
(Rule, 1985). 
 
Comparative advantage theory of international trade (Ricardo, 1817) advocates that, 
free trade enables the economies to ensure both efficiency in production and allocation of 
resources. In Ricardian framework, there is a huge incentive for the children to work due to the 
single factor of production which is labor. In this framework the child labor and adult labor, 
both are identical in all aspects. That's why, in this domain, economies with labor intensive 
industries are blamed to be the major culprit of the child labor (Hanushek, 1992). 
 
In Marxian Framework children are identified as a desired for survival and they are 






’ of the workforce brings about a fertility gain. Since, the working masses try 
to accumulate the factor of production over which they do have control (Smith, C. A., 1984). 
While, Malthus’s vision designed on the belief of decreasing returns to scale
15
 (Herrera, 2011), 
whereas the new trade theory assumes that the economy displays the increasing returns to scale 
(Krugman, 1979). In the Malthusian framework, there is a trade off between resources and 
human capital (Fraser et al., 2003). Less human capital has more resources to utilize but child 
labor cannot be protected in this framework due to decreasing returns to scale. It means every 
next unit of labor is more expensive as compared to the previous unit. It is also assumed that all 
the labor is constant in the production process and child labor and adult labor are substitutes. 
This substitution may be harmful in the mitigation polices of child labor in Malthusian 
framework (Schultz, 2009). 
 
Conventional trade theory anticipates that an increase in exporting commodity price may 
either decrease or increase the child labor, but it is based on the magnitudes of the income and 
substitution effects (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005). The literature suggests that the studies which 
examine the relationship between child labor and trade under the new trade theory are relatively 
scarce. In contrast, the mostly trade models examine the effects of international trade on the 
child labor are based on the traditional trade theory. Traditional trade theory advocates that the 
exchanges of goods and services is simply determined by relative factor differentials across the 
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 In Marxisam frame work the proletarianisation is mostly seen as the most significant form of downward 
social monbility (Rule, 1985). 
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countries on the basis of specialization in the production of goods in which the trading country 
has comparative advantage. Traditional trade theories assume that technology yields constant 
returns to scale
16
 in production, and markets are classified as perfect competition
17
. With this 
philosophy, economies deal in homogenous goods and services with each other. The 
advancement in the global trend of trade in differentiated products
18
 suggests that the trade of 
differentiated products is a dominant phenomenon in the worldwide exchange of goods and 
services. It demonstrates a substantial volume of trade flows for countries that are engaged in 
trade in differentiated products. New trade theory illustrates the trade as being driven by the 
specialization in, and the demand for, differentiated goods. The new trade theory relies on 
increasing returns to scale in production. Under these assumptions, trade may occur between 
countries with similar factor endowments and identical technologies, rather than between 
countries that are different in both aspects. 
 
Lancaster (1980) proposed a model, by using differentiated goods, in which consumers 
can vary in their “ideal variety”. However, Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1979) suggest 
an isolated consumer demanding multiple varieties or differentiated good, and they introduced a 
terminology the “love of variety”. Lancaster (1980) and Helpman (1981) also adopt the “ideal 
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 A situation in which infinite buyers and sellers exist, they are well informed and the market price of a 
goods is above the control of particular buyers and sellers (Stigler, 1957). 
 
18




variety” approach in international trade models, while Krugman (1979, 1980 and 1981) carried 
forward the “love of variety” idea due to Dixit and Stiglitz (1979) concept of specialization 
under monopolistic competition. The extensive investigation by Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
shows that these two approaches are afforded in trade literature, so this thesis will use the 
similar “ love of variety” approach as given by Krugman (1979). Feenstra (2003) describes this 
concept in a fascinating way and explain that the total number of varieties (number of firms) in 
a region necessarily falls with trade liberalization and the remaining firms have to increase the 
production to fulfill the market demand.  
 
The primary purpose of this research is to provide new insights regarding the impact of 
international trade on the child labor by using new trade theory. Furthermore, this research is an 
empirical effort to explore the relationship between the child labor and the selection, scale and 
technique effects for the selected SAARC and ASEAN countries which are engaged in the trade 
of both differentiated and homogeneous goods. Finally, it examines the effect of trade intensity 
on child labor. There has not been an empirical study that specifically addresses factors which 
influence the child labor, in the production and trade of differentiated products, namely the 
selection, scale and technique effects. Notably, the selection is specific to the trade of 
differentiated goods and a unique contribution in trade and child labor literature. Additionally, 
the scale and technique effects arising from the production of differentiated goods have not 
been explicitly shown to generate similar effects as the scale and technique effects arising from 




trade of differentiated products are integrated with the child labor effects of trade of 
homogeneous goods.  
 
4.3  Conceptual Framework 
 
Trade expands the consumption basket and enables the consumers to use both local and 
imported varieties of goods. Krugman's (1979) framework of international trade states that the 
industrial sector, having features of increasing returns to scale and total number of firms in the 
industry shrinks although each one of the remaining firms produces more than before 
(Feenstra, 2003). At the same time, when income level of a country increases due to trade 
openness; the country implements stricter child labor approach, which causes amplified child 
labor reduction activity (Edmonds, 2007 and 2015). The increasing returns to scale in 
Krugman’s framework compile the producer to hire more efficient and skilled labor to raise the 
production level. This framework has a potential to support the child labor elimination policies 
and discourage the child labor, because the producer wants to produce more and additional unit 
of adult labor is not expensive for him due to increasing returns to scale. The new theory 
suggests that the increase in the trade liberation shrinks the number of the firms in the locality; 
only the competitive firms can survive in the region other non-competitive firms have to exit 
from the competition. Therefore, the child labor in the competitive environment decreases. 
 
Figure 7 shows that in the open economy, free trade generates trade induced child labor 




number of firms in the economy falls. This framework contains three predictions concerning the 
impact of trade on the productivity of firms: one, some firms are forced to exit (selection 
effect), two, surviving firms expand their outputs (scale effect), and finally these results provide 
a basis for the technique effect, which leads to higher income levels, which induces better 
technique of production undertaken by the firm.  
 
 
Figure 7: Trade Induced Child Labor Effects 
 
In Figure 7, the trade induced selection effect is an avenue through which child labor in 
a country can change following trade liberalization. In particular, the least efficient firms have 
to exit. The remaining firms which are relatively efficient and reluctant to use child labor in the 
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production are free to raise the productivity.   Under these two circumstances the technique 
effect is sourced from the cross-country diffusion of efficient techniques. In simple words, the 
figure explains that holding the scale effect and other determinants constant, the technique 
effects refer to the turnabout in the child labor as a result of adjustments to the income level due 
to trade intensity. 
 
Based on theoretical and conceptual frameworks, this dissertation proposes the 
following hypotheses about the trade-child labor relationships which describe the impact of 
both trade of differentiated products and homogeneous goods on child labor. 
 
4.3.1  Hypothesis 1 
 
Child labor is increasing in the level of the scale of production, or positive trade 
induced child labor scale effect. 
 
Consider an economy with a labor-intensive sector that produces differentiated goods. Then, 
the production of differentiated goods corroborates that the scale of economic activities 
determines child labor in the economy. Given technology, an increase (decrease) in scale of 
labor intensive industries leads to an increase (decrease) in the labor demand (Hamermesh, 
1987), child labor is a substitute of adult labor and child labor is parsimonious as compared to 
adult labor (Basu and Tzannatos, 2003), so an increase (decrease) in labor demand leads to an 




positive relationship between labor and the production of labor intensive goods (Hamermesh, 
1987, 1996). In fact, researchers as far back as, Marx (1867) has argued that variation in child 
labor is primarily labor demand driven (Edmonds, 2007). In the current analysis, the direction 
of the effect of the scale on the child labor is similarly expected to be positive.  
 
However, in contrast to the past studies, the current study assumes that the trade-induced 
scale effect represents the expansion of industries due to trade. Hence, the scale effect in the 
current analysis assumes that an increase (decrease) in the scale of production is not only due to 
the expansion (contraction) to the production of goods with comparative advantage, but it is 
also due to an expansion (contraction) of economies of scale. Consistent with the theories, the 
aggregate scale effect of trade of differentiated products is assumed to be increasing in the child 
labor. 
 
4.3.2  Hypothesis 2 
 
Child labor is negatively associated with income level due to changes in trade intensity, 
or negative trade induced child labor technique effect. 
 
In an economy, on the one hand, the child labor regulation moves towards reduction and 
elimination of child labor in autarky situation (Weiner, 1991). On the other hand, an increase in 
the trade intensity increases the nation's wealth, this prosperity oscillate the nation behavior 




determinants constant, the technique effects refer to the turnabout in the child labor as a result 
of adjustments to the income level due to trade intensity. Literature suggests that, assuming 
child labor is unskilled and income levels are tied to trade intensity, then the trade induced child 
labor technique effect or income effect reduces the child labor in the economy. 
 
Income levels influence the child labor policy, negatively associated with child labor. An 
increase (decrease) in income level implies stricter (more lax) policy which leads to an inverse 
change in child labor intensity. This implies that holding the scale and selection effect constant, 
higher income levels lead to lower child labor. Thus, the current analysis hypothesizes a 
negative relationship between child labor and income level. 
 
4.3.3  Hypothesis 3 
 
Child labor is decreasing with the decrease in number of firms, or positive trade 
induced child labor selection effect. 
 
In the model of Krugman (1979), firms are identical in size and production technology. 
With trade, consumer chose to consume foreign products resulting in a decrease in the 
consumption of domestic varities. The fall in the number of domestic product varieties leads to 
the exit of unprofitable firms. Assuming the scale and techniques of production remains 
unchanged, a smaller the number of firms in an industry implies less labor activities, which 




number of the firms which leads to a fall in the child labor. In other words, the child labor is 
decreasing in the number of firms, citris paribus. 
 
4.3.4  Hypothesis 4 
 
The child labor is decreasing in the trade intensity or openness to trade. 
 
The impact of free trade on child labor is measured by the variable defined as the ratio 
of trade volume to GDP, namely, trade intensity. In this analysis, it is postulated that freer trade 
leads to lower child labor. This hypothesis is consistent with findings in Neumayer and De 
Soysa (2005). There are many reasons why openness to trade may contribute to the 
improvement of the child labor situation. One reason is that greater openness to trade implies an 
increase in trade flows which leads to an expansion in the scale of overall production. 
Consequently, income level rises, which implies a stricter child labor policy that stimulate the 
amelioration and lower child labor intensity (Grootaer and Kanbur, 1995). Further, openness to 
trade may accelerate an inward flow or diffusion of more efficient techniques which contributes 
to reducing child labor intensity. Therefore, holding other factors constant, greater openness to 





4.4  The Model 
 
The model formulated in this research is an extension of Krugman (1979) framework of 
international trade, provides an elegant account of the trade of differentiated products based on 
the monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale, by incorporating the child labor to 
examine the impact of trade on child labor. This section analyses the characteristics of closed 
economy along with an open economy. In this model, there is a Chamberlin economy in which 
firms are producing differentiated and imperfectly substituted goods; firms has some extent of 
market power and the key objective of these firms is to maximize their profits; non zero profits 
indulge the firms to enter or exit in the monopolistic competitive environment. Consumers, 
firms and regulatory authority are major players of the economy; monopolistically competitive 
market structure exists in the economy along with increasing returns to scale in production 
process, due to economies of scale each firm is producing only one type of product variety. 
Producers are equal, expect their design of production; similarly, firms are producing 
differentiated goods with a large number of potential varieties by using identical technologies. 
 
Firm behavior is independent with other firms in the market due to production of large 
number goods and this production has a negligible effect on the market price and demand of 
other goods. In this framework labor is a single factor of production and this labor is 
inelastically supplied in a competitive market. Income and wages are interdependent because 




to which there is an instantaneous adjustment to the change in variables. Countries, in this 
framework, are considered similar in different aspects like technology, preferences and size. 
 
In the economy, there are 𝑁  number of consumers having similar preferences and utility 
function is separate-able with the preference of variety with respect to consumption of goods. 
The positive utility is obtained by using 𝑖𝑡ℎ, good and a mildly negative utility 
19
 is associated 
with child labor, but the utility of leisure is excluded due to Krugman (1979) model constraints. 
Horizontally differentiated products symmetrically enter into utility function. Social damage 
comes from child labor, due to weak regulation in the society and consumers have no control 
over child labor. Therefore, the consumer can only maximize its utility by consuming goods. 
Thus the utility function can be written as. 
 
𝑈 = ∑ 𝑉𝑛𝑖=1 (𝑞𝑖) −  ∑ 𝜍𝑙𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  . . . (1)  𝑉
´> 0, 𝑉´´ < 0 
 
The consumer can maximize his utility by using its income which is equal to his wage, 
wage of child labor depends on age of child worker (𝜃), the consumer maximization is as 
follow: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝑞𝑖} 𝑈 = ∑ 𝑉
𝑛
𝑖=1 (𝑞𝑖) − ∑ 𝜍𝑙𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 (15 − 𝜃) . . . (2) 
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𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜: 𝑦 = 𝑤 and 5 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 15 
 
where 𝑦 = ∑ p𝑖q𝑖
n
𝑖=1  , p𝑖 denotes the price of 𝑖
th goods. For maximization of consumer 
utility the first order condition is as follows: 
 
𝑣´(𝑞𝑖) = 𝜆𝑝𝑖 . . . (3)  𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 
 
Where λ is the marginal utility of income and langrange multiplier. The share of each 
variety in the budget is insignificant due to enormous varieties of goods and services; therefore, 
the price impact of marginal utility of income can be avoided (see Krugman, 1979). The effect 








=  − (
𝑣´
𝑞𝑖𝑣
´´) > 0 . . . (4)  
𝑑𝜓𝑖
𝑑𝑞𝑖
< 0    (see, Krugman, 1979) 
Hence, the elasticity is increasing as move up along with demand curve but 
consumption is falling. 
 
Krugman (1979) suggests the linear function of labor output along with identical 
technologies having increasing returns to scale. The returns to scale is internal to firm having 
initial positive fixed cost, declining average fixed cost and the most important constant marginal 





𝑁𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖  . . . (5)   𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 ∶  𝛼 & 𝛽 > 0 
 
Where α is fixed cost of production and 𝛽 is the coefficient of variable cost. Hence, 
following equation shows the relationship of child labor and output. 
 
𝜍𝑙𝑖 = 𝑁 ∗ 𝑥𝑖 . . . (6) 
 
In the model locally engaged children are under consideration, it is also assumed that 
government or regulatory authority is not directly involved in the amelioration of labor, the 
regulatory authority can use child labor penalty as a policy tool and firms have to pay a high 
price in form of child labor penalties for engaging a child labor. In this framework, the child 
labor penalty is determined exogenously, in response to the implementation of child labor 
regulation. Firms try to avoid costly child labor penalty payments. In this model, costly child 
labor penalty payments are taken from the output that a firm produces by using labor including 
child labor. Therefore, firms allocate a proportion of output for the child labor penalty 
payments, only in case of engaging the child labor and allocate remaining portions for goods 
consumption in the market. 
 
If a firm allocates 𝑥𝑖
a unit of output in amelioration of labor, then net output:  
 
𝑥𝑖








 is the allocation of resources from output towards hiring more skilled 
workers and terminate the less skilled workers (or child labor) engaged in the production 
process, this process in the current  research is called amelioration. The individual consumers 
are also taking part as workers in the production of goods, the total labor force in the economy 
is N. Then, the supply is equal to demand of produced output, this relationship can be expressed 
as: 
 
(1- Å𝑖) 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑁𝑞𝑖  . . . (8)   0 < Å𝑖 <1 
 
Where (1- Å𝑖) is the fraction of output, which is allocated for consumption. This 
research specifies the functional form for child labor to describe the relationship between child 
labor and output, which is consistent with the approach of specifying the production technology 
in Krugman (1979,1980) models. This child labor intensity takes the following form: 
𝜍𝑙𝑖 =  (1 − Å𝑖)
𝜎  . . . (9) 𝜎 > 1 
 
The parameters 𝜎 measures the responsiveness of a change in child labor due to changes 
in the fraction of output allocated towards the amelioration. The greater the value of 
responsiveness measures (𝜎) means that lesser child labor, similarly the greater the value of 
amelioration (Å) the lesser will be child labor. Generally, in labor intensive industries such as 
manufacturing and agriculture, labor demand increases at an increasing rate with the increasing 




associated with labor demand in the economy due to substitution effect. In simple words, the 
scale of production can increase the demand for child labor, keeping other things constant in an 
economy. Therefore, for the functional form specified above, the assumption that 𝜎 is greater 
than one is reasonable and has a basis in the practical sense.  
 
Table 8: Explanation of Important Symbols 
Variables Explanation  
Amelioration (Å)  
Amelioration is the allocation of resources from output towards hiring more 
skilled workers and terminate the less skilled workers (or child labor) engaged 
in the production process, this process can be illustrated as (0 < Å𝑖 <1).  
Measures the 
Responsiveness (𝜎) 
The parameters 𝜎 measures the responsiveness of a change in child labor due 
to changes in the fraction of output allocated towards the amelioration. The 
greater the value of responsiveness measures (𝜎) means that lesser child 
labor.  
Child Labor Penalty 
(𝓉) 
The child labor penalty, 𝓉, is taken to be high enough so that firms choose to 
undertake child labor amelioration activity. If regulatory authority does not 
impose child labor regulation then it is equal to zero. In the absence of child 
labor regulation or at zero child labor penalty firms have no incentive to restrict 
the child labor in the society.  
 
The child labor penalty, 𝓉, is taken to be high enough so that firms choose to undertake 
labor amelioration activities and avoid from child labor. If regulatory authority does not impose 
child labor regulation then it is equal to zero. In the absence of child labor regulation or at zero 
child labor penalty firms have no incentive to restrict the child labor in the society. This model 





The profit function, denoted π, is the firm`s revenue less labor cost and child labor 
penalties given by the following equation: 
 
𝜋𝑖= 𝑝𝑖 (1 − Å𝑖)𝑥𝑖 − 𝑤(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖) − 𝓉𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑥𝑖  . . . (10) 
 
Since all the firms are identical, symmetry across firms implies that 
𝑝 = 𝑝𝑖 
𝑥 = 𝑥𝑖 
Å = Å𝑖 
𝜍𝑙 = 𝜍𝑙𝑖 
Henceforth, subscripts are suppressed. 
 
4.5  Monopolistic Competition and the Child Labor 
 
The profit function is the firm`s revenue less labor cost and child labor penalties such 
that: 
𝜋𝑖= 𝑝𝑖 (1 −  Å𝑖)𝑥𝑖 − 𝑤𝛼 − (𝑤𝛽 + 𝓉𝜍𝑙𝑖)𝑥𝑖 . . . (11) 
 
Where in monopistic competition 𝑃 = 𝐴𝑅 = 𝐴𝑇𝐶 = 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝐶 
 





4.6  Trade Induced Child Labor Effects 
 
In the autarky case the child labor penalty is considered as preponderant moral sentiment 
(see also Appendix A), while in the open economy case trade provides a sustainable, scalable 
and replicable solution to combat the child labor locally and globally. Changes in the trade 
intensity can have important implication effects on the consumer welfare as well as on 
economic preference. If a country wants to have a better quality care for vulnerable children, for 
example, in the form of no child labor is desirable, then, trade liberalization can be the best 
compliment for the policy makers. However, trade liberalization affects the production 
decisions at the aggregate level. Hence, in the developing economy, there exists a trade-off 
between the achievements of labor amelioration and economic objectives.  
 
4.6.1  Effect of Trade Openness on Child Labor 
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This result is consistent with the theoretical expectation that the greater the trade 
liberalization, the lesser will be the child labor. 
 
Table 9: Trade Induced Child Labor Effects 
Trade Induced Child Labor Effects Explanation 
Scale Effect 
Holding all other factors constant a change in the growth of 
the economy due to trade liberalization yields a trade induced 
child labor scale effect. 
 
Technique Effect 
Holding other factors equal a change in the income growth of 
an economy due to trade liberalization leads to trade induced 
child labor technique effect. 
 
Selection Effects 
Holding scale and technique effect constant a change in the 
trade intensity leads to a change in the number of domestic 
firms, which implies a trade induced child labor selection 
effect. 
 
Total Impact of Trade 
Total impact of trade on child labor depends upon the sum of 
the magnitude of trade induced child labor selection, scale 
and technique effect. 
 
In the previous studies, i.e. Krugman (1979,80) discusses the two types of trade induced 
effects, namely scale and selection due to trade liberalization (Feenstra, 2003). Copeland and 
Taylor (2001, 2003 and 2013) use Heckscher-Ohlin framework and find three types of trade 
induced effects i.e. scale, technique and composition. Aralas (2010) sums up the Krugman 
(1979 and 1980) and Copeland and Taylor (2001 and 2003) work and concluded there are four 
types of trade induced effects scale, selection, technique and composition. In this section, this 
research checks the effect of trade intensity on the child labor by using the trade induced child 




4.6.2  Selection Effect 
 
Thus, in the ongoing analysis, the trade intensity has a negative effect on the number of 
firms. The new theory suggests that the increase in the trade liberation shrinks the number of the 
firms in the locality; only the competitive firms can survive in the region other non-competitive 
firms have to exit from the competition.  The competitive strategy is always more profitable 
than the exploitative strategy. Estevez (2011) concludes that child labor is an inappropriate 
option for producers than unskilled adult labor even after accounting for productivity 
differences. Therefore, the child labor in the competitive environment decreases and it is called 
a trade induced child labor selection effect. 
 
The change in trade intensity on the number of firms is as given by the following: 
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)) T −1] . . . (2.4) 
∂cl
∂n 
> 0 . . . (2.5) 
 
4.6.3  Scale Effect 
 
It typically remains the truism that the trade increases scale of the economy and leads to 
an increase in the number of products produced, or an increase in the scale of production 
(Francois, 1990). 
 
x =  (1 − Å)
−1
Nq  . . . (3.1) 
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Equation 3.3 shows the trade openness increases the scale of production in the economy. 
The increase in scale of production due to trade brings income in the country and this is source 
of better technique of production in the economy.  
 
𝜍𝑙 =  Å . 𝑥 . . . (3.4)    (see, Apendex A) 
∂cl
∂x
=  Å . . . (3.5) 
Equation 3.5 shows that increase in scale of production is positively associated with 
child labor. The silver lining of this result is a source of improvement in the production 
techniques of an economy. 
 
4.6.4  Technique Effect 
 
Theoretically, an increase in the trade intensity brings a positive change in the income 
level of the nation and has a direct effect on the performance and techniques of the production. 
These techniques excel the skills of the labor in the trading countries. This analysis 
hypothesized that trade induced technique effect in the trading economy positively affects the 
amelioration. The amelioration is basically improvement in the labor standard; it means skilled, 
educated and adult labor is demanded for the production purpose in this framework. Child labor 
is supposed unskilled, uneducated and low productive labor in this analysis. The increase in the 
amelioration means the decrease in the child labor. Thus, the trade liberalization increases the 




The effect of a change in the trade intensity to the level of amelioration can be shown 
as follows: 
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The result shows that trade positively affects the amelioration or technique effect, while 
effect is negatively associated with child labor. However, at this point it's worth considering that 
the increase in labor standards or amelioration means a decrease in the child labor, in other 
words, it can be stated that trade induced child labor technique effect is negative as this research 
hypothesized earlier. The increase in trade intensity necessitates the firm to increase the 
allocation of output for labor amelioration and reduce the child labor.  
 
4.7  The Estimation Model of Trade of Differentiated Products 
 
In this section, this research expands the disintegration of the child labor effects of trade 
of differentiated products to examine the link between child labor and economic factors that 
define the trade of differentiated products. This analysis shows how the theoretical anisotropy in 
chapter four transformed into estimating equations for empirical analysis. The estimating 
equation will describes the trade effects on number of firms (differentiated products) intimated 
in the earlier section. SAARC and ASEAN countries in the sample are assumed to engage in the 
trade of both differentiated and homogeneous products with trading partners. This is one of the 
unique contribution to show the effects of trade on child labor empirically, by using trade 
induced effects. To achieve an empirical equation, the theoretical relationship needs to be 




4.7.1  Explanation of Variables 
 
There is no consistent measure, interpretation of the lawful age and working conditions 
of child labor across the countries. Two primitive categories are usually recognized in the child 
labor studies (i) economic activities and (ii) hazardous work. Child labor activity is inherently 
more difficult to measure than simple labor activity. Sometime, it rules out the necessary chores 
that children undertake as household member subject to important seasonal variations (Anker, 
2000). According to the international definition of employment, the child labor can be identified 
as economically active children if they work for at least one hour in a reference week
20.
 Thus, 
child labor in this research is a substantial as promulgated by the ILO and world development 
indicators, which is based on the agency’s Minimum Age Convention No 138 (1973). Child 
labor 𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑡 is surprisingly difficult to define, this dissertation establishes a normal definition and 
considered children under the age of 14, engage in economic activity directly in all sectors of 
the economy or school going children in employment, are part of child labor. This thesis takes 
children in employment percentage of children ages 5-14 as child labor based on available data 
base. This analysis looks at child labor in 9 SAARC and ASEAN countries and tests the 
robustness for the choice years 1999 to 2013. The intertemporal variations in child labor data
21
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 The calendar week containing the 12
th
 day of the month, which is used in the current population survey as 
the time period for documenting the employment and labor force status of respondents. 
21 
Most of countries have some independent observations for a given years. Some observations are taken by 
imputation rather than actual variation in child labor due to infrequent surveys, generally, for SAARC countries. 




are driven by imputation
22
 and some adjustments based on country wise household surveys at 
national level. Data adjustment is made to make the data comparable because data of all 
countries are not available for the same year. 
 
 
Figure 8: Child Labor and Firms Density 
Source: UNICEF (2012) and World Development Indicators (2012). 
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The missing data were imputed with the average of the observations in countries of the same region. Then 

















































In the theory, the differentiated products derive from the variation in the number of 
firms engaged in the production of differentiated goods or in the number of product varieties 
(Startz, 1989 and Feenstra, 2003). Along these lines, in the data, the differentiated product can 
be characterized by two measures: one, by the change in the number of domestic firms, and two, 
by the change in the number of product varieties produced domestically (Feenstra, 2003). 
Krugman (1979) talks about the preference of variety based on selection of variety 
(differentiated products). This is the same concept as explained by Feenstra (2003). Thus, in the 
data, the selection effect can be represented by two measures: one, by the change in the product 
varieties produced domestically, and two, by the change in the number of domestic firms. In 
current analysis change in the preference of variety is explained by number of firms. Consistent 
with other measure, the measure of the number of firms is in intensive form and it is number of 




Domestically incorporated companies in the country’s stock market are used as a proxy 
for a number of firms. 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 is used to show the effect of change in number of firms on child 
labor. This effect is due to a change in the number of firms in the economy on the basis of 
selection of product variety. 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 includes all kinds of companies, which are engaged in 
production of goods. The theory suggests that in general, the number of firms is directly 
associated with labor demand (Brainard and Riker, 1997; Fehr et al., 1998 and Felbermayr and 
Prat, 2011), similarly, child labor is directly associated with the demand for labor (Humphries, 
2010). Figure 8  presents the graphical observation of raw data to support the understanding of 




In our empirical model 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 is associated with the country-specific number of listed 
companies. Thus, the child labor and trade model suggests a definition of product variety which 
can be best defined by firm-level production that is the number of firms engaged in production 
of differentiated products. Accordingly, this research uses the number of listed domestic 
companies to represent the selection effect, sourced from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) for the years 1999-2013.  
 
Table 10: Variable Explanation and Measurement 
 Explanation Proxy Variable 
Measurement 
Selection effect 
Change in the number of product 
varieties 
Product Price - 
Change in the number of firms Listed companies 





Industrial production Industrial 
production index 
- 




Change in techniques of production FDI - 
Change income level GNP or NFFI NFFI/Population 
Capital intensity K/L - 
Trade openness 
Trade barriers Custom duties - 
Trade shares Trade intensity (X+M) /GDP 
Trade volumes X+M - 
Net exports X-M - 
 
A further concern identifies the rationale and visualization of the scale and technique 




level of accuracy and should complement with the aggregate effects of the change in child labor 
that is due to both of homogeneous goods and differentiated goods. To simplify the discussion 
in this document, it is anticipated from Mukhopadhyay and Chakraborty (2005) and Copeland 
and Taylor (2001) that, the scale and technique effects as represented by gross domestic product 
(GDP) and gross national product (GNP), respectively, measure the effect of trade. It is worth 
noting at this stage trade consists of both homogeneous and differentiated products.  
 
For this study, it might be important to discuss the problem associated with the gross 
domestic product (GDP) which is used to show the scale effect. GDP  explicate the variation in 
the scale of production due to a change in the supply of both differentiated and homogeneous 
goods, it is prudent to assume that the child labor scale effect illustrated by the change in gross 
domestic product is the aggregate effect of the changes from both the production of 
homogeneous and differentiated goods. The scale effect in this study is GDP per kilometer 
squared, because there are notable cross country differences in the GDPs of SAARC and 
ASEAN countries that can avoid the pragmatic approach to evaluate the impact of scale effect. 
Graphical presentation of raw data for this variable in Figure 9 shows an association of scale 
effect and child labor. 
 
However, a similar reasoning strategy in this context can be applied to the technique 
effect, conveniently, the income effect measured the change in child labor due to changes in 
income or gross national income. More precisely, the technique effect is the improvement in 




the higher the income level the more stringent child labor regulation will be. Thus the change in 
child labor can be represented by the change in the technique of production (see Karlan and 
Valdivia, 2011) where an increase in income level is associated with a decrease in child labor. 
 
 
Figure 9: Child Labor and Scale of Production 
Source: UNICEF (2012) and World Development Indicators (2012). 
 
In the presence of GDP, the GNP is the source of high correlation among these variable. 
This study takes the difference of GDP and GNP which is net foreign factor income (NFFI). In 
simple word it is the difference between payment given to home country labor from foreign 
people and payment given to foreign country labor from home country people. This technique is 
















































production is labor. In this way a country which has more skilled labor, will take more income 
from foreign countries or in other words more skilled labor will use better technique. 
 
4.7.2  Child Labor Effects in the Closed Economy 
 
The empirical evidence of child labor in the close economy is essential to the debate on 
the performance of different effects. Model-A shows that the change or growth in total child 
labor can be decomposed into, or is the sum of, the scale, selection and technique effect 
(respectively). The model can be quite easily solved numerically for a variety of parameter 
values. It is possible to proceed entirely numerically from this point. If we take a somewhat 
different approach, however, it is possible to characterize the properties of the model 
analytically. Model-A allows to express the demand of child labor in an autarky situation with 
respect to time (𝑡) across the countries.  
 
𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + β1𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . . . (A) 
 
4.7.3  Child Labor Effects in the Open Economy 
 
Model-A does not express the effect of trade liberalization, so this study introdues a 
trade variable. 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 is used to examine the effect of overall trade on the level of child labor. 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 is defined as the openness of trade in term of trade intensity and calculated as the import 










Figure 10: Child Labor and Trade Openness 
Source: UNICEF (2012) and World Development Indicators (2012). 
 
Trade intensity is thus the share of total trade in the GDP. The greater the share of trade 
in the GDP the greater will be trade intensity of a country and thus more open will be the 
economy to foreign competition. Use of trade intensity is very common in the literature, Fung 
and Maechler (2007) and Alam et al. (2011) and Copeland and Taylor (2001) utilize this 
variable to express the trade liberalization. Following this tradition, the current exploration also 
include this variable in the model. The graphical observation of raw data supports the 







































In the current exploration, the trade intensity is exercised to measure two kinds of 
effects. Firstly, it establishes the link between trade liberalization and child labor. Secondly, it is 
to explained in interaction forms to express the responses trade induced selection effect, scale, 
and technique effects. So, Model-A can be rewritten as: 
 
𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + β1𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + β4𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . . . (B) 
 
4.7.4  Trade-Induced Child Labor Effects 
 
Model-B only shows the effect of selection of product variety, scale of production, 
technique of production and trade on the child labor. To derive trade related child labor effects, 
an interaction term 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 can be introduced along with the variables representing the scale of 
production, technique of production, and number of firms represent the trade-induced child 
labor scale, technique and selection effects. 
 
Adding an interaction term to  Model C drastically changes the interpretation of all of 
the coefficients of selection, scale and technique effect variables in Model A. It is now 
interpreted as the unique effect of selection, scale and technique effects on child labor only 
when trade = 0. But the interaction means that the effect of these variables on child labor is 
different for different values of trade.  So, the unique effect of selection, scale and technique 
effects on child labor is not limited, but also depends on the values of trade-interacted variables 




 Following is the linear model that can be used to examine the trade-induced child labor 
effects: 
 
𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + β1𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  β2𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  β3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . . . (C) 
 
Where, 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 variable shows the change that trade brings about in a number of firms. 
Trade creates a fall in the number of firms due to economies-of-scale internal to the firms. This 
is because economies of scale make it valuable for a country to specialize in the production of 
only a limited range of products. The effect of a change in the number of firms on the level of 
child labor as a result of the change in trade intensity is called trade-induced child labor 
selection effect. In our empirical specification domestic companies per squared kilometer along 
with the openness of trade is trade-induced child labor selection effect (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝑖𝑡.  
 
𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 variable shows that change in the trade intensity brings a change in scale of 
production. The effect of the change in scale of production at the level of child labor due to a 
change in trade intensity is called trade-induced child labor scale effect. In our empirical 
specification 𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ country`s gross domestic product per squared kilometer 
interacted with trade intensity (this is trade-induced child labor scale effect) at time 𝑡. 
 
NFFI is used to determine the child labor technique effect. To find the trade-induced 
child labor technique effect, we interact the net foreign factor income (NFFI) per capita with 




in their work on trade and environment. Trade-induced child labor technique effect shows the 
effect of change in the income level on the level of child labor. 
  
4.8  Measurement and Data Sources 
 
The dependent variable, child labor, is the proportion of 5 to 14 year old children 
involved in economic activity that exists generally in developing economies. Using multiple 
imputations to adjust for missing values for child labor data, collected from various sources
23
. 
Data on gross domestic product, gross national product in 2000 dollars and other 
macroeconomic variables is sourced from the world development indicators, for the years 1999-
2013.  
 
Gross domestic product measures the scale effect induced by a change in size of the 
economy. In order to avoid strong correlation between GNP and GDP, the difference between 
the GNP and GDP will be used to disconnect the income effect from the scale effect. The new 
explanation of technique effect is measured as net foreign factor income (NFFI= GNP-GDP) or 
the net amount of nation earned in a fiscal year. Domestically incorporated companies in the 
country’s stock market are used as a proxy for a number of firms. Consistent with other 
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 Data is gathered by the access to specific databases, i.e. ILO (IPEC reports), The United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), Understanding Children's Work (UCW), Department of Census & Statistics from 
different countries and World Development Indicators etc. A comprehensive internet searches and e-mails to key 




measure, the measure of the number of firms is in intensive form and it is number of listed 




Table 11: Variable Description 
Dependent Variable 
Variable Name Variable 
Code 
Variable Explanation 
Child Labor ςlit Percentage of children (aged 5-14) engaged in child 
labor 
Data Source Various Sources 
Independent Variables 









Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per squared 
kilometer 
Technique Effect 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 Net foreign factor income (NFFI) per capita 
Trade 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 Import plus export ratio to GDP 
Trade Induced Technique Effect 
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 
Technique Effect interacted with the openness of 
trade 
Trade Induced Selection Effect 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 Selection Effect interacted with the openness of trade 
Trade Induced Scale Effect 𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 Scale Effect interacted with the openness of trade 






 in term of trade intensity (𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡) is calculated as the import plus 





. Trade intensity is thus the share of total trade in the GDP.  Alam 
et al. (2011) and Tariq and Ab-Rahim (2016) utilize this variable to express the trade 
liberalization. Following this tradition, the current exploration also includes this variable in the 
model. The effect of a change in the number of firms on the level of child labor as a result of the 
change in trade intensity is called trade-induced child labor selection effect. In this study 
domestic company per squared kilometer along with the openness of trade is used to express the 
trade-induced child labor selection effect (𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑇𝑅)𝑖𝑡. While, the effect of the change in scale of 
production on child labor due to a change in trade intensity is trade-induced child labor scale 
effect. This study interacts the trade intensity with the country`s gross domestic product per 
squared kilometer to show the trade-induced child labor scale effect at time 𝑡. Finally, to find 
the trade-induced child labor technique effect, this study interacts the net foreign factor income 
(NFFI) per capita with trade intensity (𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑅)𝑖𝑡. Copeland and Taylor (2001) use this trade-
induced technique effect in their work on trade and environment. Trade-induced child labor 
technique effect shows the effect of change in the income level on the level of child labor. 
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 It is difficult to segregate X+M into different sectors or infer a transition in trade sectors from the 
evolution of the sector selection probability.  A change in the sector selection probabilities may indicate that a 
transition in trade patterns. Observations on trade flows are not likely to fit well with a specified regression 
equation that is constant over the observation period. A switching regression model is not appropriate for Krugman 
(1979) framework, the transition in trade patterns in which a shifting from comparative advantage to product 
differentiation occurs. Infrequent surveys and data constraints also make this study specific to simple definition of 
trade openness. Literature on trade and child labor also support this proxy  (see also, Doytch et al., 2013; Estevez, 




The empirical investigation within given epistemological domains relies on the findings 
resulted from theoretical contribution which was conducted previously, in the following ways. 
First a unique empirical model articulates the discernible effects of trade for SAARC and 
ASEAN countries which are engaged in production and trade of homogeneous and 
differentiated goods. Second, the data in the gross domestic product and gross national product 
can be pursued for both homogeneous and differentiated products effects. Furthermore, this 
study deciphers the estimates of scale effects (by using gross domestic product) and technique 
effect (by using net foreign factor income) as estimates that shows the integrated child labor 
effects of an economy and these effects exist in the production and trade of homogeneous and 
differentiated products.  
 
4.9  Method  
 
The analysis is carried out using panel data models, for getting a more accurate 
measurement of whether child labor has curtailed over the period 1999 to 2013 in selected 
ASEAN and major SAARC countries. Panel data give an increased precision estimation by 
accreting time periods of data for each individual. For all that, a valid statistical inference can 
only be achieved by controlling correlation of regression model errors over time period for a 
given entity or individual. 
 
Many early studies of trade and child labor, relied solely on cross-sectional data due to 




(ILO), International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), The United Nations 
International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Development Indicators (WDI) 
and Understanding Children's Work (UCW) has enough information for child labor, therefore 
the trend is now altering and the stream of studies is rotating around panel data methods. The 
panel data allow the dynamics of individual country behavior as compared to cross section 
assortment at one specific point in time. While simultaneously, panel data analysis allows 
consistent estimates for fixed effect model, in conjunction with consistency, unobserved country 
specific heterogeneity, which sometime correlated with regressors, can be resolved in a fixed 
effects model. However, contrary to this expectation, if unobserved country specific effects are 
assumed to be distributed randomly of regressors, random effects model implies additional 
orthogonality.  
 
In order to ensure a valid statistical inference, the panel-robust statistical inferences are 
corrected for both the correlation of errors over time for major SAARC and selected ASEAN 
countries and heteroskedasticity across these countries. The Hausman specification test and 
Sargan-Hansen test
25
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 Sargan-Hansen test is an extension of Hausman test, with cluster robust version to robust to 





Table 12: Panel Data Models with a Small Number of Countries. 
Static Models 
Fixed effects (FE) The fixed-effects model controls for all time-invariant differences between the 
individuals, so the estimated coefficients of the fixed-effects models cannot be biased 
because of omitted time-invariant characteristics. 
Random Effects (RE) The random effects model is used when some omitted variables are constant over time, 
but vary between counties, and others may be fixed between countries but vary over 
time. RE estimator is a weighted average of fixed and between effects. 
Fixed-Effect Versus Random-Effects Models 
The Hausman test checks a more efficient model against a less efficient but consistent model to make sure that the 
more efficient model also gives consistent results. 
Dynamic Models 
Mean Group (MG) Mean Group estimator (MG) which is based on estimating N time-series regressions and 
averaging the coefficients (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). It consists of estimating separate 
regressions for each country and computing averages of the country-specific coefficients, 
which will provide consistent estimates of the long-run coefficients. The least restrictive 
procedure and it allows for heterogeneity of all the parameters (imposes no cross-country 
restriction). Does not take account of the fact that certain parameters may be the same 
across groups. 
Dynamic Fixed Effect 
(DFE) 
Dynamic Fixed Effect  imposes homogeneity of all slope coefficients, allowing only the 
intercepts to vary across countries 




PMG estimator which is a combination of pooling and averaging of coefficients (Pesaran 
et al., 1999). Intermediate estimator (between DFE and MG). Allows the intercepts, 
short-run coefficients and error variances to differ freely across groups, but constrains 
the long-run coefficients to be similar across groups. 
Note: This study is based on static models, to present a comparative statics analysis of the effects of an increase in 
the trade intensity which generates trade-induced scale, technique and selection effects. 
Source:  Hsiao (2014)  
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 A basic requirement of the PMG estimator is that it T should be large (Pearson, Shin and Smith 1998). 
Using Monte Carlo experiment, it can be shown that the Mean Group (MG) estimator is consistent but it is unlikely 
to be a good estimator when either N or T is small (Pearson, Shin and Smith 1998). Since the basic assumption of 





4.10  Unobservable Variables  
 
Unobservable parameters such as the exogenous demographic attributes, labor market 
attachments, education system and child labor preference in the production process (as a 
compliment or substitute) can be considered as time invariant country specific effects 
represented by the unobserved heterogeneity, denoted as 𝜀𝑖. 
 
It is also noted that common-to-all-countries effects such as relative income 
idiosyncrasies and unconventionalities in amelioration process and dynamic technological 
improvements, may be considered as time-specific effects, denoted as ℶ𝑡. Machine error in 
reading child labor concentrations and human error in the calculation is a source of 
idiosyncratic error represented by 𝜇𝑖𝑡. To expound the unobserables and individual effects of 
the model are specified in the following way: 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖+ℶ𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 
ℶ𝑡  is a time-specific effect, 𝜀𝑖 is a country specific effect, and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 idiosyncratic 
measurement error for country at time.The most familiar fixed effects and random effects panel 
data treatments for count data are suggested by Hausman et al (1984). An alternative of 




used cluster-robust standard error as it allows the determination of the most appropriate 
estimator between the fixed and random effects models. 
 
If country-specific effects contained in the unobserved random component, which may 
be a case of many practical applications in international economics, are correlated with 
predictors, then fixed effects estimator allows for consistent estimation of the model. In contrast 
to the fixed effects model, sometime the unobserved country-specific heterogeneity is 
distributed randomly of the predictors, in this case, consistent and efficient estimation 
contingent upon the model of the random effects estimator. Note that the pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator is inconsistent if the true model is the fixed effect model. Pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is inconsistent, while the pooled OLS is consistent but 









5.1  Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter is a presentation of empirical results, which evaluates the prospective of 
trade induced effects on child labor in the SAARC and ASEAN countries. Estimating equations, 
based on the predictions of the theoretical framework refers to the previous chapter, explain the 
various effects of trade. This chapter consists of descriptive statistics, discussion of empirical 
results and alternative specifications for SAARC and ASEAN countries. 
 
5.2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The descriptive statistics of the variables employed are reported in Table 13. Total 
number of observations used in the empirical analysis, means, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum values of variables provide a useful information of child labor and other explanatory 
variables. The summary statistics of the variables contains the data from 9 SAARC and ASEAN 
countries27. The data consists of 15 years (1999 to 2013) with a total number of 135 
observations.  
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  Major SAARC countries, namely, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and selected 





Table 13: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Name Variable Code  Mean  Max Min  Std. Dev. 
Child Labor ςlit 15.91 52.3 1.47 14.47 


















Technique Effect 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 67.97 178.62 0.26 24.87 
Trade 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 70.45 150.32 25.54 36.76 



























Unemployment 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 4.78 11.9 0.2 2.89 
Literacy rate 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 71.32 97.23 32.57 20.27 
Note: Literacy rate measures the  percentages of the population, age 15 and above, who can read and write. 
The unemployment comprise all labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. 
 





points, while the technique effect (NFFI per capita) varies from 0.26 
points to 178.62 points and the scale of the countries (GDP/km
2
) varies from a low of 753 to a 
high of 8730 with a mean of 3660. The explanatory variable trade changes between 25.54 
percent to 150.32 percent with a mean of 70.45 percent which implies that some economies are 
more open to trade than others, the trade induced selection effect variable has a minimum of 




technique effects are 246000 and 2360 respectively. The mean of unemployment and literacy 
rate indices are 4.78 percent and 71.32 percent, respectively.  
 
5.3  Empirical Results 
 
The estimation procedure of this research consists of five steps. In the first step, an 
exposure assessment of the simple model by capturing selection, scale and technique effects 
obtained for the child labor in SAARC and ASEAN respectively in closed economy case. In the 
second step, a variable of trade combined with selection, scale and technique effects variables in 
both regions to find the effect of change in trade on child labor. Next, in the third step, the 
synergies of both SAARC and the ASEAN countries examine the selection, scale and technique 
effects with trade intensity to provide a preliminary assessment of how trade affects the child 
labor. Subsequently, the fourth step presents trade interactions to check the trade induced effects 
across the SAARC and ASEAN countries. As the theoretical framework suggests that the trade 
induced effects are the key determinants of  child labor. Finally, a number of other explanatory 
variables added to the closed economy and open economy models to investigate the relationship 





5.3.1  Estimation Results for Model A and Model B 
 
This regression for ASEAN countries is based on 60 observations. A low R
2
 of models 
A and B have low predictive value under these circumstances in theory for ASEAN countries. 
While the regression for SAARC countries is based on 75 observations. While the regression in 
a set of SAARC plus ASEAN countries is based on 135 observations, the significant 
improvements are witnessed in R
2 
for Models A (0.295) and B (0.298), it shows that  a 
sufficient amount of variation is explained by Model A and Model B. 
 
Table 14 presents initial estimates of selection, scale and technique effects with the help 
of Model A for autarky and Model B for open economy. In calculating the selection, scale and 
technique effects with child labor it as assumed that the relative position of selected ASEAN 
and major SAARC countries in the world remains constant between 1999 to 2013. Consistency 
across the regressions in the sign of the estimated coefficients reported in the majority of 
variables for both SAARC and ASEAN countries and t-values reflect the relevance of these 
variable. 
 
Table 14 indicates that there is a negative; however it is statistically insignificant 
relationship between child labor and selection effect for SAARC countries and for ASEAN 
countries, while a statistically significant relationship is found in a set of ASEAN plus SAARC 
countries for a closed economy (Model A). Furthermore, the results for open economy (Model 




labor and selection effect for SAARC countries, for ASEAN countries and in a set of ASEAN 
plus SAARC countries. 
 
Table 14: Estimation Results for Model A and Model B 
Dependent Variable: Child Labor 
  Model A Model B 
 ASEAN SAARC SAARC& 
ASEAN 





























































Observations 60 75 135 
 




- overall 0.043 0.280 0.295 0.009 0.287 0.298 
*** indicating significance at 1-percent  
** indicating significance at 5-percent 
* indicating significance at 10-percent 
SEL: Country specific number of listed companies per squared kilometer. 
TEC: Net foreign factor income (NFFI) per capita 
SCL: Gross domestic product (GDP) per squared kilometer 
TRADE: Import plus export ratio to GDP 
Note: 𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + β1𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . . . Model A 




An insignificant negative relationship between child labor and technique effect is found 
for ASEAN countries, while there is a negative and statistically significant relationship exists 
for SAARC countries and in a set of ASEAN plus SAARC countries in Model A. Further 
investigation reveals that child labor in SAARC countries is less responsive to technique effect 
as compared to ASEAN countries and empirical evidence shows an insignificant relevance of 
predictor and dependent variable for ASEAN countries. The linear interaction term of trade 
induced technique effect is positive in the set of both SAARC and ASEAN countries. 
 
The estimates for Model A indicate that a one unit increase in the scale effect variable 
raises child labor by about 1% in ASEAN, 0.32% in SAARC and 0.62% in the composition of 
SAARC and ASEAN countries, by keeping other effects constant. Whereas, the estimates for 
Model B indicate that a one unit increase in the scale effect variable raises child labor by about 
1% in ASEAN, 0.8% in SAARC and 0.04% in the composition of SAARC and ASEAN 
countries, by holding all other things equal. 
 
Another variable of interest which shows a positive association with child labor is trade 
variable, trade variable reports that an increase in the trade to GDP ratios raises the child labor. 
The results in Table 14 reveals that there is a positive and statistically significant association 
between child labor and trade openness for ASEAN countries, for SAARC countries and in a 
set of ASEAN plus SAARC countries. In the Model B for child labor, response to the trade 
variable is statistically significant at the 10 percent level of significance in a separate setting of 




insignificant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance in a combine set of SAARC plus 
ASEAN countries. The reason of this weak relevance is that the standard error of trade induced 
selection effect coefficient is very large, so this statistic is unable to give a significant response. 
 
The results of Table 14 imply a substantial evidence to suggest that the fixed effect 
model is more appropriate because unobserved country specific heterogeneity is associated with 
predictors in a separate setting of SAARC and ASEAN countries. While, in combine setting, 
there is a sufficient evidence to suggest that the estimates derived from random effect estimators 
are consistent and efficient.  
 
5.3.2  Discussion of the Results  
 
There are two notable features of results for Model A and Model B. One, for 
econometric model in Table 14, F-test statistics confirm that at the 1 percent level of 
significance there is sufficient evidence against the null hypothesis that difference in cross 
country variances is not zero in a separate setting of SAARC and ASEAN countries. These 
results validate the existence of country specific effect, therefore, pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates are inappropriate in the analysis. Two, in Table 14, the scale, selection and 
technique effects are used with trade intensity variable and these trade induced variables use 
demeaned data by removing their sample mean with the exception of selection effect which is 
taken at steady state values. Consequently, the interpretations of scale and technique variables 




estimates of scale and technique effects which are measured from the average trading country. 
In other words, this is a normal trading country, a country whose trade intensity is equal to 
sample mean value.  
 
The selection effect term indicates a negative relationship between the number of listed 
companies and child labor. The paradox results of selection effect, consider that the reduction in 
the number of competent firms engaged in the production of differentiated goods can be a 
source of increase in child labor or an increase in the competent firms can be a source of 
reduction in child labor in both SAARC and ASEAN countries. These results are consistent for 
model A and B in all cases. 
 
The theoretical model predicts that at high income levels, the countries have better 
techniques of production; this in turn implies the labor accumulation fall as development 
proceeds and finally a significant reduction in child labor. In Model A, the results presents the 
authentication of this prediction while in Model B, this prediction is verified only for SAARC 
countries. Based on models A and B of Table 14, this analysis finds a positive relationship 
between the scale of economic activity as measured by GDP/km2 and child labor. The scale 
effect is consistent with a positive sign in both regions, while in model B, when it measures for 
both SAARC and ASEAN together, the sign is surprisingly negative; but the magnitude of this 
effect is very small. So, the effect of scale effect variable on child labor is positive. Hence, a 
positive scale effect as an increase in this scale of production have a cumulative impact on child 




Relatively simple hypotheses regarding the effect of international trade on child labor 
investigated by adding measures of openness of trade in Table 14. Theoretical framework in this 
thesis establishes a negative relationship between trade and child labor, while empirical 
evidence shows an insignificant relevance of predictor and dependent variable. The results 
demonstrate that, the trade variable is not significant at conventional levels and signs are also 
unexpected in a set of SAARC plus ASEAN countries. These findings report that trade 
openness (greater global integration) may be correlated with an increase in child labor in a set 
of both regions, although this association is not valid at conventional levels of significance, but 
there appears to be a positive relationship between trade and child labor. This increasing trend 
in trade variable probably reflects a labor intensive production technique in major SAARC and 
selected ASEAN countries, which can be a source of an increase in child labor in these 
countries.  The findings of the research indicate that the positive effect of trade on child labor 
phenomenon does not match with theoretical expectation.  The main reason, why does the 
relationship change its direction and child labor enter the labor force at higher stages trade 
openness, is that the factors increasing child labor supply in developing countries have become 
more effective as a result of integration with global economy as compared to demand side 
factors. Busse and Wittwer (2001) and Neumayer and De Soysa (2005) provide the evidence 
that trade openness can be a cause of high incidence of child labor in developing countries. 
While the trade openness brings modest changes in the magnitude of some of the coefficients 
for scale and technique effects variables in Table 14. Overall the estimates, given in Table 14, 





5.3.3  Estimation Results for Interacted and Non-interacted Models 
 
Table 15 indicates that there is a negative, but statistically insignificant relationship 
between child labor and selection effect for SAARC countries and for ASEAN countries, while 
a statistically significant relationship is found in a set of ASEAN plus SAARC countries in non-
interacted form (Model A). Furthermore, the results of interacted
28
 form model (Model C) 
indicates that there is a positive and statistically insignificant relationship exists between child 
labor and selection effect for SAARC and  ASEAN countries, while a negative and statistically 
insignificant relationship is found in a set of ASEAN plus SAARC countries. 
 
The results in Table 15 show that there is a negative, but statistically insignificant 
relationship between child labor and technique effect for ASEAN countries, while there is a 
negative and statistically significant relationship exists  for SAARC countries and  in a set of 
ASEAN plus SAARC countries for a non-interacted model (Model A). However, investigation 
from interaction terms reveals that child labor in SAARC countries is less responsive to 
technique effect as compared to ASEAN countries and empirical evidence shows an 
insignificant relevance of predictor and dependent variable for ASEAN countries. The linear 
interaction term of trade induced technique effect is positive in the set of SAARC plus ASEAN 
countries.  
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 These interactions terms capture the combined effect of two variables i.e., selection and trade (trade 
induced child labor selection effect), scale effect and trade (trade induced child labor scale effect) and technique 




Table 15: Estimation Results for Interacted and Non-interacted Models 
Dependent Variable: Child Labor 
Model A Model C 
Non interacted Interacted 
 ASEAN SAARC SAARC& 
ASEAN 
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Observations 60 75 135 60 75 135 
R
2  
Overall 0.04 0.28 0.30 0.08 0.23 0.25 
*** indicating significance at 1-percent  
** indicating significance at 5-percent 
* indicating significance at 10-percent 
SEL: Country specific number of listed companies per squared kilometer. 
SELTR: Selection Effect interacted with the openness of trade 
TEC: Net foreign factor income (NFFI) per capita 
TECTR: Technique Effect interacted with the openness of trade 
SCL: Gross domestic product (GDP) per squared kilometer 
SCLTR Scale Effect interacted with the openness of trade: 
Note:  𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + β1𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . . . Model A 






The estimates for the SAARC countries reveals that one unit change in the scale effect, 
brings 0.010 while this effect is 0.039  units in child labor in the ASEAN countries. Whereas, 
taking interaction of scale effects brings -0.111 units change with a 90% confidence interval for 
SAARC countries and it imply -0.001 for ASEAN countries with high standard error. In a set of 
SAARC plus ASEAN countries this change varies from 0.0062 to -0.0004 units for non-
intracted and interacted models respectively. 
 
5.3.4  Discussion of the Results for Interacted and Non-interacted Models 
 
The trade variable in previous section measures the predicted change in child labor for a 
1% change in the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. This measure indicates that a 1 percent 
change in the share of trade in GDP increase the child labor by 51 percent major SAARC 
countries and 10.8 percent in the selected ASEAN countries and 1.32 percent in both SAARC 
and ASEAN countries. On the other hand, the estimates in Table 15 indicate that a change in 
trade induced effects lowers the child labor. One possible cause for such a change is trade 
openness. The results may seem different in isolation as the estimates from Table 15 indicate 
that trade produces the trade induced effects toward child labor. For trade variable a positive 
sign is traced for the given sample of countries, it is also out of theoretical prediction. Although 
we have only a sample of countries, it seems reasonable to expect both positive and negative 
can be expected. As a check on theoretical explanation this thesis examined each country’s 
trade intensity data, surprisingly, both child labor and share of trade in GDP are declining in 




other findings are roughly consistent with our theory and predicts that trade induced child labor 
effects can be a disintegrated into scale, selection and technique effects.  
 
Table 15 shows a negative relationship between child labor and selection effect for 
SAARC, ASEAN and ASEAN plus SAARC countries in non-interacted form. Results of 
interacted form indicates a positive association between child labor and selection effect for 
SAARC and ASEAN countries, while a negative relationship is found in a set of ASEAN plus 
SAARC countries.The results show that, the strategy for identifying the trade related impacts of 
scale, selection and technique variables is successful for ASEAN and SAARC countries in a 
separate setting. The data set observe a noticeable heterogeneity in the number of firms for most 
of the SAARC and ASEAN countries. Therefore, for the selection effect variable this research 
is using the number of listed companies per square kilometer or it is a firm intensity in the 
country. For trade induced child labor selection effect, the selection effect is interacted with 
trade variable.  
 
Neutral technological progress increases the scale of production (Solow, 1956) and 
creates a positive trade induced scale effect (Krugman, 1979). According to the results 
hazardous effects of the scale effect is offset by a negative trade induced child labor scale effect. 
Therefore, estimates indicate that increases in economic activity driven by the trade induced 
scale effect lower the child labor. Recall that there are great differences among SAARC and 
ASEAN countries; therefore, the scale effect is measured in the intensive form 𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝑘𝑚2 and 




study examines that the deviation in the scale of production across countries can be isolated 
from technique effect. Therefore the recognition that scale should be examined in intensive 
form due to theoretical restriction. While, the technique effect is measured by net foreign factor 
income (NFFI) which is the difference between payment to the foreign people and local country 
people. This isolation reduces the correlation between the scale and technique effect variables.  
 
Only, selection and scale effect exercise is not tests of new trade theory, if surprisingly, 
child labor is reduced by an increase in the scale of production and competency of firms, then it 
will be more interesting to observe the effect of trade induced child labor technique effect in 
these two regions. The results are reassuringly close to what one may have expected with these 
effects. More speculatively, these thoughts, trials may also offer a possible explanation for child 
labor in SAARC and ASEAN countries. Note that, the coefficient of trade induced child labor 
technique effect Table 15 is negative and significantly different from zero in both SAARC and 
ASEAN regions. On the other hand, in case of a combine data set of SAARC plus ASEAN 
countries, there is a positive trade induced child labor technique effect. This is a somewhat 
surprising result because it is predicted that trade has an overall negative technique effect 
keeping scale and selection effect constant. 
 
The further investigation reveals that child labor in SAARC countries is much less 
responsive to technique effect as compared to ASEAN countries. The influence of trade induced 
technique  effect is negative with respect to child labor in a separate setting of SAARC and 




induced child labor technique effect is negative. While, in a set of SAARC plus ASEAN 
countries, the child labor increases due to technique effect in these countries, so the hypothesis 
of negative trade induced child labor technique effect cannot be accepted in a group of both 
regions. It is worth noting that  the coefficient of trade induced technique effect is insignificant 
for ASEAN countries and  Model C  for ASEAN countries has a slightly smaller R-squared. 
While  for SAARC countries coefficient of technique effect is very small. So in a set of SAARC 
plus ASEAN countries, the different sign can be possible. Another point to be noted here that 
Cambodia and Nepal have high trade to GDP ratios with a high incidence of child labor as 
compared to other countries. So, these countries togather in a group of SAARC and ASEAN 
countries effects the trade induced child labor technique effects. 
 
The linear interaction term of trade induced technique effect is positive in the set of both 
SAARC and ASEAN countries and while in a separate setting of these regions has a negative 
association. It shows that, if a country has a relatively low level of production skills and 
techniques relative to the rest of the world, then keeping all else held constant, the impact of 
further openness can make these countries vulnerable to children. On the other hand, Estevez 
and Levy (2014) examine that, if a country has a sufficiently skilled labor and better technique 
of production relative to the rest of the world, then the impact of trade induced child labor 
technique effect can make this country a safer place for children.  
 
Several features of result are presented in the Table 15. First, the trade interactions 




particular, the desired signs from trade interacted regressors are obtained, while the significance 
levels are reduced by the inclusion of the trade interactions in the separate setting of SAARC 
and ASEAN countries. Second, the coefficient of trade interacted variables has a great 
influence, whereas in non- interacted form the coefficient looks very small. Third, the sign 
pattern of the interaction terms is as expected from theory.  
 
These results indicate that trade induced child labor selection, scale and technique 
effects are still at work determining, but in non-interacted form selection, scale and technique 
effects considerations is also matter. The majority of signs and statistical significance of the 
estimates in Table 15 are according to theoretical predictions. Moreover the signs for the 
selection, scale and technique are plausible, because in most of the cases, these trade induced 
effects signs lead to a reduction in child labor.  
 
The remaining part of analysis suggests that freer trade is more likely to be good rather 
than bad for the child labor and is subject to several provisos. This work has several robust 
maintained assumptions that may be deceitful, because the data on child labor is not perfect, and 
may be varied on different data source. Clearly much more need to be done along these lines 
mentions in this section. In order to meet these demands the next section of this thesis present 
alternative specification test. Overall the results are surprisingly similar to those presented in 






5.4  Alternate Empirical Specifications 
 
To account for the possibilities of robustness to the scale, technique and selection 
effects, this study proposes an alternative specification in section 5.4.1, by adding education and 
unemployment. Moreover, section 5.4.2 compares the test results across different groupings of 
SAARC and ASEAN countries which give a deep understanding of trade induced effects. 
 
5.4.1  Alternative Specification 
 
In section 5.3, this study compares the alternative econometric models regarding to their 
ability to explain the robustness of the results obtained in the previous section. The alternative 
specifications are: Model  A2 and C2. In the model A2 the literacy rate is introduced to represent 
the education and to examine the robustness of other variables. Education variable was ignored 
in Model A1 to check the effect of pure demand side factor scale, selection and technique effect, 
which does not include any interaction terms, specifies an estimating equation that represents 
the scale, selection and technique effect in close economy. Model C1 is a simple trade induced 
child labor model with no trade variable, whereas trade intensity is interacted in Model A1 
variables i.e. scale, selection and technique effect. Model C2 includes unemployment as an 
additional variable. The marginal effects of child labor from other factors are also important for 
understanding the impact of trade in the given trade and child labor setting. This section briefly 
summarize the results of models A1, A2, C1 and C2. This section begins with Model A1 and A2, 




In the models A1 for child labor, responses to the selection, scale, and technique effects 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level of significance. The coefficient estimates of 
the scale, and selection effects are statistically significant at the conventional level. Whereas, 
the coefficient estimate of the technique effect is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels, although a 95 percent level of confidence is a standard level but the response of 
technique effect is statistically significant at 90 percent confidence level. 
 
In the model A2 for child labor, responses to the selection, scale, and technique effects 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level of significance. Whereas, the coefficient 
estimate of the variable for educaton is not statistically significant at any level of significance. 
The Model A2 with education variable, generate statistically insignificant estimates for the child 
labor. Strikingly, this analysis finds no significant effects of literacy on child labor reduction. 
The results obtained from EDU variable are not very robust, so, this variable has a trivial effect 
on other variables. While, in Model A1 this variable was ignored and the estimates present 
better significant impacts. In simple words, the scale, selection and technique's effects in 
autarky situation are not affected by inclusion or exclusion of education variable. For the trade 
and child labor analysis, random effects estimation of Model A2 shows that selection effect 
variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance. In the cases of child 
labor, the sole insignificant estimate is education. An explanation of education in this model 





Table 16: Alternative Specification 
Dependent Variable: Child Labor 








































UNEP    -0.0001 
(-0.30) 
 




















  Overall 0.30 0.37 0.25 0.12 
***Significance at the 99-percent confidence level. 
**Significance at the 95-percent confidence level. 
*Significance at the 90-percent confidence level. 
SEL: Country specific number of listed companies per squared kilometer. 
SELTR: Selection Effect interacted with the openness of trade. 
TEC: Net foreign factor income (NFFI) per capita. 
TECTR: Technique Effect interacted with the openness of trade. 
SCL: Gross domestic product (GDP) per squared kilometer. 
SCLTR:  Scale Effect interacted with the openness of trade: 
EDU: Percentage of the population age 15 and above who can read and write. 
UNEP: Share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. 
Note: 𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + β1𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . . . Model A1 
𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + β1𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + β4𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . . . Model A2 
𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + β1𝑆𝐸𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . . . Model C1 




In model C1, only trade-induced effects are estimated. However, and interestingly, the 
estimates of the selection effect variable are statistically insignificant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level of significance, the reason of this weak relevance is that the standard error of trade 
induced selection effect coefficient is very large relative to the statistic, so this statistic is unable 
to give a significant response. The coefficient of selection has an unexpected negative sign, but 
without significance. It shows that there is no direct effect of trade induced variables on child 
labor. While, responses to the scale and technique effects are statistically significant at the 10 
percent level of significance. 
 
Model C1 is extended by including an extra variable unemployment to see the effect of 
trade induced child labor effects. The new model is Model C2 and it shows the approximately 
similar results in term of significance and signs for trade-induced effects i.e. the selection, scale, 
and technique effects. Hence, this new variable has no significant effect on child labor 
reduction. The coefficient of unemployment is insignificant and opposite to theoretical 
explanation. The reason for this unexpected sign and significance is the lack of theoretical 
support and incongruity for the model which is checking the trade induced child labor effects by 
using demand side factors for child labor demand while unemployment in Model C2 address the 
supply side factors of child labor. That’s why the supply side factor is misfit with demand side 
factor. The remaining part of analysis compares the test results across different groupings of 





5.4.2  Robustness of Results 
 
Table 17 shows that in column 1, without Cambodia and Nepal, the selection effect is 
positive and consistent with the theoretically predicted strategy that a decrease (increase) in the 
number of firms leads to a decrease (increase) in the child labor. Results in column 1 express 
that holding all other variables constant, a unit change in the selection variable brings 
approximately 20 percent positive change in the level of child labor in the same direction for the 
data set of selected SAARC and ASEAN countries. It means, if the number of firms decrease 
the child labor will also decrease. It is important to discuss that the purpose selection effect is 
not as offering universal explanations or predictions, while this effect enhances the 
understanding of complex child labor situation in literature. 
 
Next, the scale effect is explained by gross domestic product per kilometer square 
(GDP/km
2
), the result of scale effect is against the theoretical prediction as it was assumed that 
an increase in scale of production, increases the demand of child labor due to direct association 
of labor demand with child labor demand. Estimates of scale effect in models show there is an 
inverse association between trade induced scale effect and child labor. The coefficient indicates 
that holding constant all of the other predictors in the model, a unit increase in trade induced 
scale effects brings 0.01 percent reduction in child labor. It was assumed that this effect can be 
harmful for child labor, but unpredictably, it is helpful in the child labor reduction. This result 
strengthens the argument that the increase in scale of production under Krugman framework is 




Table 17: Robustness of the Results 
Dependent Variable: Child labor 
Estimation Equation: 𝜍𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + β1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑇𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 + β3𝑆𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑡 + β4𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . . . Model B 



































      






















 Overall 0.31 0.26  0.59 0.29 
Note: Figure in the parentheses are t-statistics, except for Breusch–Pagan test, Hausman test, which are p-
values. 
*, ** and *** indicate the respective 10%, 5% and 1% significance level.  
SEL: Country specific number of listed companies per squared kilometer. 
TEC: Net foreign factor income (NFFI) per capita 
SCL: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per squared kilometer 
TRADE: Import plus export ratio to GDP 
Column 1: Includes the SAARC countries, namely, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka and selected 
ASEAN countries, namely, Indonesia, Philippine, and Thailand. 
Column 2: Includes the SAARC countries, namely, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal, and ASEAN 
countries, namely, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Thailand. 
Column 3: Includes SAARC countries, namely, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and selected 
ASEAN countries, namely, Cambodia, Philippine, and Thailand. 
Column 4: Includes major SAARC countries, namely, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka 






The technique effect is described by the lagged per capita net foreign factor income 
(NFFI). Regression estimates for column 1 suggests that there is a negative association between 
technique effect and child labor. In column 1, a one unit increase in technique effect variable 
can cause up to a 0.01 percent decline in child labor. The t-value (t = -2.90 ) denotes that the 
estimated coefficients, for trade induced technique effect, are statistically different from zero at 
conventional levels of significance.  
 
The trade variable is represented by a trade to GDP ratio. In main model, which assumes 
linearity in all regressors, the coefficient of trade openness is statistically significant at a one 
percent level of significance. This result shows a substantial evidence to suggest that a one unit 
change in trade intensity brings a 36.96 percent positive change in child labor. The estimated 
coefficient is significantly different from theoretical proposition. Trade variable has unexpected 
and significant positive sign. This could result from a non-distinction between the trade of 
differentiated goods and trade of homogeneous goods, similar result has already been reported 
by Kis–Katos (2006), as she concluded that the real income effect of trade can also increase the 
aggregate child labor and the impact of trade on the child labor also depends on the techniques 
of productions with a change in income levels across countries. 
 
The second column in Table 17 shows the set of three countries each from SAARC and 
ASEAN countries. This set encompasses Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal from SAARC region 
while from the ASEAN region, Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand are included because on 




the coefficient of selection effect is not significant, however the sign of this variable is 
positively associated with child labor. The sign of selection effect variable, with respect to child 
labor, is positive and consistent with the theoretically predicted strategy that a decrease 
(increase) in the number of firms leads to a decrease (increase) in the child labor.  
 
The next variable in terms of strength of association with child labor is scale effect, it is 
described by gross domestic product per kilometer square (GDP/km
2
), The result of scale effect 
is against the theoretical prediction as it was previously assumed to increase in scale of 
production, increases the demand of child labor due to direct association of labor demand with 
child labor demand. Estimates of scale effect in the Model B show a statistically significant 
negative relationship between scale effect and child labor. The coefficient estimates indicate 
that holding the all remaining factors constant, a unit increase in scale effect variable brings 
0.07 percent reduction in child labor. It was assumed that child labor can increase due to scale 
effect, while child labor is decreasing due to this effect. This result strengthens the significance 
that the scale of production in the economy when it is aligned with the openness of trade. 
 
The technique effect shows a positive association with child labor. In column 2, a one 
unit increase in technique effect variable brings a 0.01 percent rise in child labor. The p-value 
denotes that the estimated coefficients, for technique effect, are statistically different from zero 





The coefficient estimate of trade intensity is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
of significance. This result provides a substantial evidence to suggest that a one unit increase in 
trade intensity variable brings a 18.23 percent increase in child labor. The relationship of trade 
and child labor receives a considerable theoretical attention because available theoretical and 
empirical literature on child labor under the new trade theory is not well equipped. The stressing 
sign of trade variable can reverse the conclusion. Instead of positive effect on child labor, trade 
may turn the effect into negative one. This result is consistent with the Kis–Katos (2006) 
findings, as she examine that the real income effect of trade can also increase the aggregate 
child labor and the impact of trade on the child labor also depends on the techniques of 
productions with varying income levels across the SAARC and ASEAN countries. 
 
Column 3 of Table 17 shows the responses of changes in the scale, selection and 
technique effects on the level of child labor, in seven SAARC and ASEAN countries taking 
three countries from ASEAN and four from SAARC region. The random effects model is found 
to be more efficient and appropriate in Hausman test. Random effects estimations indicate that 
there are two opposing theoretical predictions in column 3. Firstly, the technique effect which is 
statistically insignificant and secondly, the scale effect which is an optimal reverse prediction in 
favor of child labor reduction activities. This analysis explains that selection effect is a reliable 
predictor of future real economic activity. The direction of the effect of the selected variable on 
the child labor is positive, consistent with the theoretically predicted strategy that a decrease 
(increase) in the number of firms leads to a decrease (increase) in the level of child labor. 




predictor in column 3 of Table 17. The only scale effect variable in column 3 shows a statistical 
significant relevance with child labor. This effect is statistically and economically significant at 
the conventional significance level (p < 0.05). The sign and statistical significance are 
consistent with previous research of Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006). 
 
The standard errors of other variables are relatively large and these estimates are not 
significant at the 5 percent level of significance, therefore, the technique and selection effects 
are statistically insignificant at conventional levels of significance. Similarly, the association 
between trade and child labor is not statistically significant. P-values indicate that the null 
hypothesis cannot be accepted at the 5 percent level of significance. In this analysis, selection 
and technique variables are not statistically significant; while the scale effect is statistically 
significant. It would suggest that only scale effect exists, but the remaining selection effect and 
technique effects are absent.  
 
Table 17 reports the statistically significant estimates for the technique and scale effects 
in column 4 at the 1 percent level of significance. Both effects have a negative association with 
child labor. The findings of scale effect endorse the negative relationship between scale and 
child labor. For the scale effect, the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1 
percent level in column 4. There is strong evidence to suggest that a one unit increase in scale of 
production brings 0.04 percent decrease in child labor. A one unit increase in the trade induced 





Estimates for trade variable is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. More 
formally, t-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimate of the trade 
variable is equal to zero. On the basis of these estimates, there is an absence of trade intensity 
effect independently. The absence of a trade variable on child labor may be described by the 
possibility that the variations in the level of trade intensity do not affect child labor directly, but 
trade is a source of trade induced child labor effect as explained in this trade and child labor 
framework.  
 
In determining the appropriateness of the estimator i.e fixed effect estimator versus 
random effect estimator Hausman test and Sargan-Hansen test with cluster-robust standard 
errors are recommended in this study. The Hausman test, presented in column 1 of Table 17, 
shows that at conventional levels of significance null hypothesis can be rejected, as it validates 
the addition orthogonality condition under random effects estimator. In comparison, it is 
important to note that, statistically significant coefficient estimates are derived from estimations 
by excluding Cambodia and Nepal under fixed effects estimation in Table 17. The remaining 
estimates of Table 17 gives a sufficient evidence against fixed effect estimates. Therefore, in all 
remaining models, there is a sufficient evidence to suggest that the estimate derived from 
random effect estimators are consistent and efficient. The interesting finding in these results is 
that, statistically insignificant coefficients are obtained on exclusion of India and Indonesia 
from a given data set. These results express that exclusion of India and Indonesia from selected 
ASEAN and major SAARC countries has adverse effect on estimation results. On the other 




generated by the random effects models are consistent and efficient. In this case, therefore, in 
explaining the following regression results, a similar trend is found in full, sample of all 
selected ASEAN and major SAARC countries, therefore this analysis demonstrates the 
estimates based on the random effect models.  
 
Table 16 and 17 points two different estimation options i.e. fixed and random effects 
model with dependent variable child labor. In Table 17, the results of selection, scale and 
technique effects along with trade intensity are presented. While in the Table 16 a sensitivity 
analysis of scale, selection and technique effects in both autarky and open economies are 
presented by including some other variables in estimation equation. Table 16 comprising of four 
estimating models Model A1, Model A2, Model C1 and Model C2. Model A1 and A2 don't deal 
with trade intensity separately while in Model C1 and Model C2 trade intensity is interacted with 
selection, scale and technique effects to check the effect of trade induced child labor scale, 
selection and technique effect. These results suggest that trade induced effects exist in SAARC 
and ASEAN countries when it is calculated for average country in the sample. The findings of 
Table 17 and 15 propose the following links of trade and child labor. 
 
First, Selection, scale and technique effects of close economy and trade induced child 
labor selection, scale and technique effects seemed simply to be correlated with child labor.  
 
Second, there is substantial evidence to support the main idea that the selection effect is 




firms in the close and open economy, it is seen that the main findings are robust with respect to 
a number of firms (selection effect) and trade induced child labor selection effects. In the 
models A1 to C2, the coefficient estimates of the selection effect variable are significant in the 
closed economy model while the trade interacted model this variable lost the significance.  
 
Third, the estimates of the coefficients of scale effect variables in the closed and open 
economy are statistically significant at all levels of significance. These findings indicate the 
relative importance of scale effect with respect to significance.  
 
Fourth, The exceptions found the mixed evidence to responses the effects of the 
technique and scale effects on child labor in the closed and open economy. Comparatively, the 
coefficient estimates of the effects of scale and technique variables look very small but they are 
theoretically important and statistically significant for an explanation of the child labor 
phenomenon. 
 
Fifth, the education and unemployment provide insignificant explanation. Results show 
that for the child labor, adding new variable, i.e. education and unemployment have no effect on 
selection, scale and technique effect variables.  
 
Finally, trade intensity variable is not part of the alternative specification, this 




that substituting variable are irrelevant in models A2 and C2. Only the trade variable has a 






CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
6.1  Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter contains several sections: the first section reiterates the findings and 
highlights the key results of the research work, followed by discussions on trade induced child 
labor selection, scale and technique effects. The chapter closes with a discussion of the 
limitations of the study and policy and recommendations based on the results of this research. 
 
6.2  Summary of the Results 
  
The premise of the analysis explores that the international trade is integrated with the 
trade of differentiated goods described by the framework of new trade theory and trade of 
homogenous goods described by the theoretical framework of traditional trade. However, the 
composite effects of an integrated open economy can be disintegrated into various trade induced 
effects. In doing so, this dissertation aims to ascertain whether the impact of trade of 
differentiated products on child labor can be decomposed into selection, scale and technique 
effects. The past empirical studies, which are based on the traditional trade framework, show 




research the comparative advantage is altered by product differentiation which need a better 
skills hence less chances of child labor. 
 
The analysis complements the existing literature on the subject of child labor by 
discussing the role of trade induced child labor effects in Krugman (1979) model. According to 
new trade theory, a country that starts out with a largely unskilled labor risks being excluded 
from trade in differentiated goods with the other countries, as the latter form exclusive clubs. 
Trade openness can thus further impoverish developing countries with particularly unfavorable 
initial conditions. For all these reasons, child labor is likely to rise. The results seem to be fairly 
robust to alternate model specifications. The analysis casts doubts about the wisdom of using 
trade openness to control child labor. Instead, the results suggest that trade induced child labor 
selection, scale and technique effects are effective in reducing child labor in SAARC and 
ASEAN countries. However, the analysis could not find empirical evidence that exposure to 
international trade reduce the incidence of child labor.  
 
Theoretical framework has presented an imperfect competition model of a small 
developing country to examine the incidence of child labor. A general conclusion which can be 
drawn from the framework is that the trade will be more effective, if its effects applied at a 
more disaggregated level. This conclusion has been reached by comparing the different effects 
of trade on developing countries. Furthermore, the framework suggests that trade openness to 
combat the child labor can be examined carefully by using trade induced child labor effects. The 




labor that are often the focus of the anti-globalization movement. The analysis finds no support 
for the view that selection, scale and technique effects instigated by trade are associated with 
increases in child labor. The intuition looks realistic and when it is investigated solely on 
SAARC and ASEAN countries. 
 
The results confirm that if firms are engaged in production of differentiated products in 
an integrated economy, then an empirical estimation of the total impact of trade on the child 
labor needs to be accounted for a selection effect in addition to scale and technique effects. This 
has a national and global significance because it highlights the association between the selection 
effect of the trade and child labor. The ex-ante theoretical realization is admissible with ex post 
parameters for selection, scale and technique effects. In some measures, expectations for the 
effects are aligned with theoretical forecast, while in some cases the predictors appear to have 
an opposite effect from the one intended.  
 
The selection effect is the impact of economic integration with trade driven market 
structure through product differentiation associated with choice process. Openness of trade not 
only affects the number of firms (a number of varieties) inside the economy, but also the 
incidence of child labor across the international borders. A theoretical explanation of selection 
effect is that, holding the scale and technique effects constant, trade in differentiated goods 
induces a trade related child labor selection effect i.e. openness to trade implies an access to 




product varieties. The change in the number of firms or number of varieties brings a change in 
child labor or simply it is called a trade induced child labor selection effect. 
 
The results show that, selection effect hypothesis holds true in the case of SAARC and 
ASEAN countries when Cambodia and Nepal are excluded from the data set. The empirical 
result in conjunction with the theoretical backdrop gives the consonant sign for the selection 
effect in the selected group of seven SAARC and ASEAN countries. While in full group of 
major SAARC and selected ASEAN countries, statistically significant coefficient estimates 
found mixed evidence, the results are robust across the different empirical models and across 
different combinations of countries. The empirical estimates confirm the prediction of trade-
induced child labor selection effect postulated by the trade framework. In other words, there 
seems a robust indication to support the hypothesis that the change in the incidence of child 
labor is due to the selection effect. Furthermore, the current analysis proposes a linear 
relationship between the selection effect and child labor and the sign of the trade induced child 
labor selection parameter is expected to be positive under trade and child labor framework.  
 
The findings are robust to the selection effect for the trade framework. The results 
endorse that a change in the number of firms brings a proportionate change in the child labor, 
holding other things constant. The emancipation of child labor from selection effects is found 
nearly opposite in their direction. Furthermore, theoretically important outcomes can be 
described by underlying assumptions of the trade and child labor frameworks which is 




with the new trade theory, by  considering that  countries are engaged in the trade of both 
homogeneous and  differentiated goods. An adequate explanation of empirical evidence favors 
the hypotheses postulated by a theory that child labor is affected by selection effects in an open 
economy. The estimation shows the impact of international trade on child labor needs to be 
controlled for the selection effect, simultaneously, the commonly accepted scale and technique 
effect of international trade. The estimates of selection effect are shown to be robust across five 
different specifications and across 9 SAARC and ASEAN countries with a different set of 
combination. 
 
The findings are based on previous work on trade and child labor literature, which seek 
to resolve the heated debate and serious concern about the international trade. This study 
departs considerably from much previous work by professeing the estimation of the impact of 
international trade on child labor which needs to account for a selection effect, a variable that 
can be favorable to describe the patterns of the exchange of goods across borders. The potential 
of unbiased estimation lies in the effect to resolve the important issue which may be significant 
for policy recommendations.  
 
The findings of trade induced child labor scale effect strongly refute the presumption 
that child labor may increase with the increase in scale of production. In simple words, the scale 
of production due to trade liberalization is not a hazard for a reduction in child labor. Trade 
induced child labor scale effect finds a considerate feedback to the treatment of child labor in 




significant negative relationship between the scale of production and child labor level, which is 
not consistent with theoretical predictions. However, in the context of child labor, the scale 
effect can be confounded by the fact that interaction of trade intensity enables this effect to 
control child labor. The ongoing econometric models for trade and child labor suggest that an 
increase (decrease) in the level of scale of production lowers (raises) the child labor, holding 
everything else constant. Second, the responses of the trade induced child labor scale effect 
variable are statistically significant for the functional form which specifies linearity in the scale 
variable. These results present the regional evidence on the transformation of economic growth 
to a child labor reduction in the SAARC and ASEAN countries, with the emphasis on the role 
of trade induced child labor scale and technique effects. In the context of international trade 
effects, the evidence suggests that the realization of data has a substantiate assertions that trade 
driven scale effects play a significant role in falling child labor.  
 
The ongoing analysis finds that there is a lack of statistical evidence for trade openness. 
These revelations are sufficiently startling to show the need of further investigation. The 
expected favorable effects of trade liberalization on child labor depend on the Kis-Katos and 
Sparrow (2007) which has been examined both on theoretical and empirical grounds by many 
researchers. Rahman and Khanam (2012) found that the theoretical arguments regarding the 
effects of trade on child labor is ambiguous and empirical evidences also provide us mixed 
results. The findings of trade openness are not too encouraging. These findings may raise 
concerns regarding the effect of trade on child labor. From a normative perspective, child labor 




opportunities  can help the  developing countries to reduce child labor. The findings in this 
research corroborate that technique effect is statistically significant for child labor. The 
regression results, for the countries in the sample, show that estimates of the technique and scale 
effects can be revealed with the new trade theory framework as contrasted with the traditional 
trade theory framework. Estimations of the scale and technique effects for the child labor 
generate mixed findings regarding the inherent characteristics and sources of child labor.  
 
The explanation of favorable effects of trade liberalization on child labor is that when 
domestic borders opens for foreign countries, it brings better technology in the home country. 
So, adaptation of less labor intensive technology produced abroad substitute for labor intensive 
technologies used domestically, thus a reduction in child labor in the home market. A second 
possible justification is that openness to trade can bring labor amelioration that is embedded 
with imported production technology. The diffusion of better techniques of production in the 
domestic market alleviates child labor. Interestingly, these possibilities are inconsistent with the 
result of positive coefficient estimates of trade, which are statistically significant in the models 
for child labor. The results show that, the coefficient estimates of the trade intensity variable are 
consistently positive in signs for all specifications. The results show that international trade has 
adverse effect on child labor, depending on the available data and speciation of the model. 
 
 These results negate the theoretical prediction that greater openness to trade leads the 
lesser the child labor. The theoretical framework purpose analysis suggests that openness to 




theoretical evidence. So, the widespread trade and child labor realization need to be 
decomposed into trade induced child labor selection, scale and technique effects.  
 
Theoretical analysis of child labor in this study develops a theoretical model that 
clarifies the role of trade of differentiated products on child labor as distinct. There are some 
unique contributions related to study and use of theory, one, this research proposes an empirical 
framework for analyzing the trade and child labor relationship which integrates the effects 
differentiated products on child labor. Two, it tests the theoretical treatment of child labor by 
using selection, scale and technique variables. More specifically, it tests the selection effect on 
the child labor level. Three, it investigates the impact of trade on the child labor in SAARC and 
ASEAN countries, namely, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Philippine, and Thailand. Lastly, it provides an evidence to answer the central 
question, how the trade induced effects can influence the child labor. 
 
6.3  Recommendations of the Study 
 
Based on the results of the analysis, it looks that trade is harmful for child labor. While 
trade induced child labor effects are beneficial for child labor. If it is assumed that trade is 
harmful for child labor, then policy makers recommend trade sanctions on countries. Maskus 
(1997) and Estevez (2011) provide a detailed discussion of this point and conclude that the 
sanction has probably counterproductive because sanctions are very likely to harm children 




have to live in a household with a lower family income and less nutrition. In fact, the trade 
sanctions in developing countries are deceptive, disingenuous and misguided because of 
political forces. The data of trade to GDP ratios for SAARC and ASEAN countries suggest that 
trade to GDP ratio is unfavorable. So, it is recommended that these countries should increase 
the volume of trade to improve the trade to GDP ratio. 
 
This research is not arguing that child labor is good and desirable per se. In fact, it is 
assumed that in an ideal world, children would not have to work and be able to spend all their 
time on education. What this research makes clear is that such an ideal world can be afforded 
only if countries are free to trade. The harsh truth is that comparative advantage of trade is 
considered as a root causes of child labor, still exist and will continue for the foreseeable future. 
A complete elimination of the demand for child labor is not realistic (not possible due to some 
informal sectors of an economy), while the sectors that are engaged in production and trade of 
differentiated products can be incentivized through the use of targeted policies that takes into 
account the association between the productivity of firms in a specific sector and its effect on 
the demand for child labor. However, it is essential to have a reasonable confidence that trade 
policies put in place will reduce the child labor. 
 
Firms that are engaged in production of differentiated goods need to be incentivized 
through the use of targeted trade policy. The firms where the productivity gap between skilled 
(adult workers) and unskilled (child labor) small, trade liberalization can have adverse effects 




where the productivity gap between skilled (adult) and unskilled (child workers) labor is 
relatively large and the more productive firms see little benefit in employing children. In this 
scenario, the trade will result in the exit of firms that employ proportionally more children, 
which will lead to a decrease in the demand for child labor. Child labor penalty, which increase 
production costs and are generally accompanied by negative welfare effects, can also be used to 
decrease the profitability of firms that heavily rely on child labor. 
 
6.4  Limitations of the Study 
 
The selection effect is an avenue through which child labor can change following trade 
liberalization. In particular, if the least-efficient firms are the ones to exit, then the demand of 
child labor will decrease. Note that the “symmetry” assumption that all firms are of the same 
size and efficiency (it follows that the exit of some would not automatically change child labor). 
This assumption was made for analytical convenience, but contradicts the empirical fact that 
every country has a very wide range of firms operating within it.  
 
The empirical literature on demand side factors of child labor is relatively limited due to 
the scarcity of reliable data. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain firm level data on child labor, 
which can be beneficial to validate the results and even the survey’s reliability can be uncertain 
due to resistance by firms to disclose the information on the child labor and wages paid to these 
unlawful workers. Data of adult labor is widely available while the data for economically active 




information is crucial for calculating the trade induced child labor effects. The lack of perfect 
data hampered the study’s ability to determine the trade induced child labor effects. So, there is 
an evident need for time series data on child labor. 
 
6.5  Directions for Future Research 
 
A brief review of different trade induced effects suggests that further analysis of the 
microfoundations of the trade-child labor links is a rich area for future research, shedding 
further light on the broad linkages empirically examined in this research. The empirical 
estimates cannot be able to find any direct circumstances of the trade that stimulated higher 
incidences of child labor that trying to identify such circumstances in the future could be the 
direction of future research.  It is important to discuss that the purpose selection effect is not as 
offering universal explanations or predictions, while this effect enhances the understanding of 
complex child labor situation in literature. There may be some legitimate concern with the 
impact of labor practices on SAARC and ASEAN region workers, which may be equally 
motivated by humanitarian concerns for children. The selection effect discussed in this 
dissertation can be equally motivated on moral grounds related to the consumer for SAARC and 
ASEAN countries is another direction for the future researchers. As a closing comment, it is 
important to stress the fact that many directions for future research are now open. This study 
believes that the dynamics of educational achievement must be modeled together with labor 





6.6  Policy Implications 
 
The concluding part finds out that child labor is falling in SAARC and ASEAN region, 
but it may have a number of informal explanations. The trade induced effects under the new 
trade theory can implement a range of strategies to improve the compliance. Due to trade 
induced child labor effects, SAARC and ASEAN countries would no longer need child labor to 
gain a comparative advantage because most of the countries in both regions can compete on a 
more level of the playing field. This dissertation sets out the following policy implication which 
takes into account the validity of the research. 
 
6.6.1  Policy Implication of Scale and Technique Effects 
 
Trade induced child labor effects are allowing the earnest support to reduce the child 
labor, but they need a further technical support and rigorous empirical evaluation. The question 
arises which trade induced effect appears to have a greatest reduce the child labor. First and 
foremost, the empirical evidence points out the role of trade induced child labor technique and 
scale effects in giving rise to the elimination of inefficient child labor. From a theoretical 
perspective, countries without access to better technique of production may not be able to 
reduce the child labor. Estevez and Levy (2014) also examine that advancement in the 
technique of production is biased toward skilled workers, and less chances of unskilled labor or 
child labor in the production of differentiated goods. The results of this study suggest that 




production relative to the rest of the world, then the impact of trade induced child labor 
technique effect will make this country a safer place for children. 
 
The economies of scale (scale effect) have a centrifugal effect towards the child labor, 
tends to push economic activity into spreading out and would be opposed by the centripetal pull 
of access to world markets, which tend to promote concentration of economic activity. In the 
production of differentiated products the economy continues to grow and the supply of low 
skilled jobs dries up and sustained growth will result in an increase in high skilled jobs in all 
sectors. This, in turn, will decrease child employment. It is therefore expected that the impact of 
growth will lead to a shift toward more skilled workers and less child labor. So, this study 
recommends that the increase in scale of production need to be continue in SAARC and 
ASEAN countries. 
 
6.6.2  Policy Implications of Selection Effect 
 
In general the child labor enforcement strategies draw resources from other productive 
activities in the economy. These resources might be better devoted to other strategies with the 
help of trade induced child labor selection effect. This study suggests that the aggregate welfare 
of trade induced child labor selection effect may be higher by allowing some child labor to exist 
rather than seeking for complete elimination of child labor. Progress toward the elimination of 
child labor can be made with a fall in the number of  firms. This analysis also finds out that an 




the countries. The differentiation requires better labor skills and techniques. So, it nullifies the 
role of unproductive labor practices (child labor) and the policy implication of selection effect is 
fairly subtle. So, a successful product differentiation strategy is recommended to reduce the 
child labor in SAARC and ASEAN countries. 
 
6.6.3  Policy Implication of Trade Openness 
 
Indeed, trade liberalization improves the earnings opportunities for local citizen of 
countries and trade liberalization raises the country’s exposure to international competition. In 
this way inefficient firms in import competing industries may be forced out of competition in 
business. Regardless of the long run, gains from the re-allocation of resources, in the short run, 
these arrangements may be a sterilizing factor for child labor treatment. So, it is recommended 
that trade facilities in SAARC and ASEAN should be flourished. 
 
Finally, this research proposes that the trade induced child labor effects can be 
worthwhile to address the underlying economies that gives a rise to offend child labor practices. 
As discussed previously, trade sanctions arguably lie at the heart of the most egregious forms of 
child labor exploitation in developing countries. If these countries have an easy access to global 
markets, they would be able to enhance the scale of production and finally it improves 
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A.1  Monopolistic Competition and the Child Labor 
 
A.1.1  Production 
 
The profit function is the firm`s revenue less labor cost and child labor penalties such 
that: 
 
𝜋𝑖= 𝑝𝑖 (1 −  Å𝑖)𝑥𝑖 − 𝑤𝛼 − (𝑤𝛽 + 𝓉𝜍𝑙𝑖)𝑥𝑖  . . . (A-1) 
 
Where in monopistic competition 𝑃 = 𝐴𝑅 = 𝐴𝑇𝐶 = 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝐶 
 
𝑝 =  𝑝𝑖 (1 −  Å𝑖)𝑥𝑖   . . . (A-2) 
 
By putting the values of p𝑖 and 𝜍𝑙𝑖 , in equation 11 (see, Chapter 4), the following profit 
function is obtained: 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 ((1 − Å𝑖)𝑥𝑖)((1 −  Å𝑖)𝑥𝑖) −  𝑤𝛼 − 𝑤𝛽𝑥𝑖 − 𝓉(1 − Å𝑖)
𝜎
𝑥𝑖  . . . (A-3) 
 
A.1.2  First Order Conditions 
 






𝑥 + 𝑝(1 − Å) − 𝑤𝛽 −  𝓉(1 − Å )
𝜎
= 0  . . . (A-4) 
 
Divide equation by (1 − Å) and rearrange to obtain: 
 
𝑝´(1 − Å)𝑥 + 𝑝 − 𝓉(1 − Å )
𝜎−1
− 𝑤𝛽(1 − Å)
−1
  . . . (A-5) 
 
The first order conditions for profit maximization with respect to Å is: 
 
−𝑥𝑝´(1 − Å)𝑥 − 𝑥𝑝 +  𝜎𝓉(1 − Å )
𝜎−1
𝑥 = 0  . . . (A-6) 
 
Divide the equation (A-6) by −𝑥 and rearrange, equation (A-6) can be written as: 
 
𝑝´(1 − Å)𝑥 + 𝑝 −  𝜎𝓉(1 − Å )
𝜎−1
= 0  . . . (A-7) 
 
A.1.3  Second Order Conditions 
 




= 𝑝´´(1 − Å)𝑥 (1 − Å)𝑥 + 𝑝´(1 − Å)
2
+ 𝑝´(1 − Å) . . . (A-8) 
 
Since p´ =  
∂p
∂𝑥
< 0 and assuming p´´ =
∂2p
∂𝑥2
< 0, then 
∂2π
∂𝑥2
< 0 and satisfy the second 













inverse effect on prices and profits of the firms, so there is need to check these effects by using 
Å which is fraction of output allocated towards labor amelioration. 
The second order condition for profit maximization with respect to resources allocated 




= −𝑥𝑝´´(−𝑥) (1 − Å)𝑥 + 𝑥𝑝´(1 − Å)𝑥 (−1)𝑥 + 𝑝´(−𝑥) + (𝜎 − 1)𝜎𝓉(1 − Å)
𝜎−2
 (−1) . . . (A-9) 
 
Since 𝑝´ =  
𝜕𝑝
𝜕Å
> 0 and assuming 𝑝´´ =
𝜕2𝑝
𝜕Å2
< 0, then 
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕Å2
> 0 and satisfy the second 




 > 0 , 
𝜕2𝑝
𝜕Å2
 < 0 and 
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕Å2
> 0, shows that, firstly the fraction of output allocated towards a 
labor amelioration, increase the product price but after that due to an amelioration in the labor 
less fraction of output allocated towards labor amelioration, hence it decreases the product price 
prices and lesser resources allocated towards the labor amelioration. 
 
A.2  The Labor Amelioration  
 
Rearrange, equation (A-5) and equation (A-7) to obtain: 
 
𝜎𝓉(1 − Å)𝜎−1 − 𝓉(1 − Å)
𝜎−1




Dividing through by (1 − Å)−1, collect terms and rearrange to obtain: 
𝓉(1 − Å)
𝜎























 . . . (A-12) 
 
When firms hire the labor at high cost, then, skilled, trained and educated workers are 
preferred then no need of training (amelioration), on the other hand, if firms take the labor at 
very low cost then there is a need of amelioration for the workers (Freeman, 2000). Thus, the 
fraction of output allocated towards labor amelioration. 
 
Then, substituting into equation 9 (see, Chapter 4),  the equation for child labor intensity 
can be written as: 
 
𝑐𝑙 = (1 − Å)
𝜎
  . . . (A-13) 
 

















 . . . (A-14) 
Equation (A-14) shows that wage (𝑤) and co-efficient of wage are directly related to 
child labor, but child labor penalties and response in child labor due to the fraction of output 
allocated towards the consumption are inversely proportion to child labor. 
 
A.3  Table A.1: Relationship of Child Labor and Amelioration with Different Variables 







Note: -ve indicate the negative relationship with child labor and amelioration. 
+ve indicate the positive relationship with child labor and amelioration. 
 
A.4  Effects of Child Labor Policy 
 
Changes in the child labor policy can have implication effects on the consumer welfare 
as well as economic preference. If a country wants a better quality care for vulnerable children, 
for example, in the form of no child labor is desirable, then, stringent child labor regulation can 
be imposed to attain it. However, a strict child labor policy affects the firm`s production 
decisions in the consideration of rising compliance costs. Hence, in the developing economy, 
there exists a trade-off between the achievements of child labor policies and economic 
objectives. This section of study analyzes the effects of an increase the robustness of child labor 




for the following variables: the fraction of output allocated towards amelioration, and child 
labor intensity. 
 
A.5  Amelioration 
 
Theoretically, an increase in child labor penalty is expected to increase the fraction of 
output used for the amelioration of labor. Thus, if child labor penalty increase then the marginal 
benefit of reducing child labor increases. 
 
From equation (A-12), the effect of a change in the child labor penalty to the level of 
amelioration can be shown as follows: 
 
























) > 0 
 
The result shows that the direction of the relationship between a positive change in the 
child labor penalty and fraction of output allocated for amelioration is positive. Hence, an 
increase in child labor penalty increases the fraction of output allocated for the amelioration of 
labor. In other words, stricter child labor regulation acts as an incentive for the firm to assign a 




The increase in child labor penalty necessitates the firm to increase the allocation of 
output for labor amelioration and reduce the child labor penalty payments.  
 
A.6  Child Labor Intensity 
 
From equation (A-14), the effect of a change in child labor penalty on child labor 









=  −𝓉 −2 (
𝑤𝛽
𝜎 − 1
) < 0 
 
An increase in the child labor penalty persuades the firms to allocate more resources 
towards reducing child labor. This result is consistent with the theoretical expectation that a 
stricter child labor policy leads to the firm`s decision to increase its labor amelioration. Further, 
since the level of amelioration is increasing, that increases the wage rate or income which leads 
to a decrease in child labor intensity.  
 
A.7  Policy Induced Child Effects 
 











𝑖=1  . . . (A-15) 












Let 𝑥𝑖(1 − Å)𝑞𝑖











𝑛𝜍𝑙 = 𝑛 . Å . 𝑥 . . . (A-16) 
 
Let 𝑛𝜍𝑙 = 𝐶𝐿 
 
𝐶𝐿 = 𝑛 . Å . 𝑥 . . . (A-17) 
 
Take a logarithmic transformation of the equation equation (A-17) and write as:  
 



























 . . . (A-19) 
 
Then, take the percent change (multiply through by 100%) to obtain: 
 
𝐶?̂? = ?̂? + Å̂ + ?̂? . . . (A-20) 
Thus, equation (A-18) shows that the impact of regulation on child labor can be 




Selection effect =  ?̂? 
Technique effect = Å̂ 
Scale effect = ?̂? 
 
Hence, the impact of the production of differentiated goods generates three types of effects, 
namely the selection, scale and technique effects. 
 




















) > 0 





=  −𝓉 −2 (
𝑤𝛽
𝜎 − 1
) < 0 
 
An increase in child labor penalty decreases the child labor intensity. 
This is policy induced technique effect. 
 
𝑝´ =  
𝜕𝑝
𝜕Å
> 0 and 𝑝´´ =
𝜕2𝑝
𝜕Å2
< 0 An increase in child labor penalty increase the labor amelioration it 
raises the price level initially, then fall in the price level.  
 
p´ =  
∂p
∂𝑥
< 0 and p´´ =
∂2p
∂𝑥2





An increase in production increases the supply of goods and services. It 
decreases the price of and profit margins. 
 
𝐶?̂? = ?̂? + Å̂ + ?̂?.  
An increase in child labor penalty may increase or decrease the total 
level child labor in economy depending on the sum of policy induced 
scale, technique and selection effects. 
 
In autarky case, this model shows that the effect of child policy can be decomposed into 
policy induced selection, scale and technique effects. Further, this model shows that stricter 
child labor policy, i.e. The child labor penalty increases the labor amelioration and decrease the 
child labor. The aggregate impact of change in child labor policy is sum of policy induced 







B.1  Imputations Methods 
 
The nature of the missing data points, leads this study, towards three complementary 
approaches, as described by Pasteels (2013).  
 
In the first case, time series has short gaps between existing data points (gaps are not more than 
three successive years). The missing periods are interpolated using a logarithmic growth 
function. 
 
In the second case, an alternative (second best available) source of data for a given country is 
utilized for the missing periods. 





This information is employed to fill missing data points in the preferred time series (first best 
variable a), and the growth rate for second best source (variable b) is used.  Note that this 
imputation approach is used for only ASEAN countries.  
 
 
